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Abstract
Given two random variables X and Y , an operational approach is undertaken to quantify the “leakage” of
information from X to Y . The resulting measure L (X→Y ) is called maximal leakage, and is defined as the
multiplicative increase, upon observing Y , of the probability of correctly guessing a randomized function of X ,
maximized over all such randomized functions. A closed-form expression for L (X→Y ) is given for discrete X and
Y , and it is subsequently generalized to handle a large class of random variables. The resulting properties are shown
to be consistent with an axiomatic view of a leakage measure, and the definition is shown to be robust to variations
in the setup. Moreover, a variant of the Shannon cipher system is studied, in which performance of an encryption
scheme is measured using maximal leakage. A single-letter characterization of the optimal limit of (normalized)
maximal leakage is derived and asymptotically-optimal encryption schemes are demonstrated. Furthermore, the
sample complexity of estimating maximal leakage from data is characterized up to subpolynomial factors. Finally,
the guessing framework used to define maximal leakage is used to give operational interpretations of commonly
used leakage measures, such as Shannon capacity, maximal correlation, and local differential privacy.
I. INTRODUCTION
How much information does an observation “leak” about a quantity on which it depends? This basic question
arises in many secrecy and privacy problems in which the quantity of interest is considered sensitive and an
observation is available to an adversary. The observation could be intentionally provided to the adversary, as occurs
when a curator publishes statistical information about a given population. Or the observation could be an inevitable,
if undesirable, consequence of a design. In the latter case, which is the focus of this paper, we call the observation
the output of a side channel. Some examples of side channels include:
• When using the Secure Shell (SSH), after the initial handshake, each keystroke is sent immediately to the
remote machine, as shown in Figure 1. When communicating over a wireless network, an eavesdropper can
observe the timing of the packets which are correlated with the timing of the keystrokes, and hence with the
input of the user (e.g., the inter-keystroke delay in ’ka’ is significantly smaller than that in ’9k’ [1]).
Fig. 1. The Secure Shell: each keystroke is sent immediately to the remote machine.
• Consider an on-chip network that has several processes running simultaneously, one of which is malicious.
Because resources such as memory and buses are shared on the chip, the timing characteristics (e.g., memory
access delays) observed by the malicious application are affected by the behavior of the other applications
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2(e.g., memory access patterns) and can leak sensitive information such as keys. Similar phenomena occur when
users share links or buffers in a communication network [2].
• Consider the Shannon cipher system (shown in Figure 2) in which a transmitter and a receiver are connected
through a public noiseless channel and share a secret key. Unless the key rate is very high, the public message
depends on the message [3].
Fig. 2. The Shannon cipher system.
• An adversary could “wiretap” a communication channel to intercept transmissions. The wiretap channel is
typically noisier than the main channel, but its output nevertheless depends on the transmitted message [4,5].
• Suppose one would like to anonymously transmit a message through a given network (say, a call for protest
on a social network). A powerful adversary (say, a government) could learn the spread of the message (i.e.,
who received it), which is correlated with the identity of its author [6,7].
• Cellular networks track the locations of its users in order to route calls. Such tracking data might reveal private
information of the user (such as their political affiliation, their place of work, etc.) [8,9].
Although at first glance such side-channels may seem innocuous, many works have shown that they pose a
significant security threat [1,10]–[16]. For instance, Zhang and Wang [10] show how to use the keystroke timing
in SSH to reduce the search space for passwords by a factor of at least 250. Kocher [13] shows how to break
implementations of RSA using timing information. Ristenpart et al. [17] show how secret keys can be extracted
from co-resident virtual machines on production Amazon EC2 servers through microarchitectural timing channels.
Addressing such threats first requires an answer to the question posed at the outset. That is, if X is a random
variable representing sensitive information and Y is the output of a side-channel with input X ,
How much information does Y leak about X?
Let L (X→Y ) denote a potential answer. Before discussing existing approaches, we posit that a good choice of
L (X→Y ) should satisfy the following requirements:
(R1) It should have a cogent operational interpretation. That is, a system designer should be able to explain
what guarantees on the system an upper bound on L (X→Y ) provides. In the context of side channels, the
design goal is typically to prevent the adversary from guessing sensitive, discrete quantites such as keys and
passwords. Thus the leakage measure should be interpretable in terms of the adversary’s difficulty in guessing
such quantities.
(R2) Assumptions about the adversary should be minimal (since guarantees are void if any assumption does not
hold true). Indeed, one would like to take into account a large family of potential adversaries.
(R3) It should satisfy axiomatic properties of an information measure:
a) The data processing inequality: L (X→Y ) ≤ min{L (X→Z) , L (Y→Z)} if X − Y − Z is a Markov
chain.
b) The independence property: L (X→Y ) = 0 if and only if X and Y are independent.
c) The additivity property: if (X1, Y1) and (X2, Y2) are independent, then L
(
X21→Y 21
)
= L (X1→Y1) +
L (X2→Y2).
3(R4) It should accord with intuition. That is, it should not mis-characterize the (severity of) information leakage
in systems that we understand well.
A. Common Information-Theoretic Approaches
Notably, many commonly-used information leakage metrics do not satisfy the above requirements. For example,
mutual information, which has been frequently used as a leakage measure [3]–[5][18]–[21], arguably fails to satisfy
both (R1) and (R4). Regarding the latter, consider the following example proposed by Smith [22].
Example 1: Given n ∈ N, let X = {0, 1}8n and X ∼ Unif(X ). Now consider the following two conditional
distributions:
PY |X =
{
X, if X mod 8 = 0,
1, otherwise.
and PZ|X = (X1, X2, . . . , Xn+1).
Then the probability of guessing X correctly from Y is at least 1/8, whereas the probability of guessing X correctly
from Z is only 2−7n+1 for Z. However, one can readily verify that I(X;Y ) ≈ (n + 0.169) log 2 ≤ I(X;Z) =
(n+ 1) log 2 [22].
Regarding the former, note that operational interpretations of mutual information arise in transmission and
compression settings, which are different from the security setting at hand. Moreover, in those settings, mutual
information arises as part of a computable characterization of the solution, rather than as part of the formulation
itself, i.e., the transmission and compression problems are not defined in terms of mutual information.
Mutual information could potentially be justified by appealing to rate-distortion theory [23, Section V]. In fact,
a number of leakage measures in the literature are based on rate-distortion theory. For instance, Yamomoto [24]
introduces a distortion function d and measures the privacy of PY |X using inf xˆ(·)E[d(X, xˆ(Y ))]. Schieler and
Cuff [23] discuss (and generalize) an example that shows the inadequacy of this approach, if conventional distortion
measures such as Hamming distortion are used.
Example 2: Given n ∈ N, let Xn be i.i.d ∼ Ber(1/2) and let K ∼ Ber(1/2) be independent of Xn. Suppose
d is the Hamming distortion and let PY |Xn be as follows: if K = 0, Y = Xn; otherwise, Y = X¯n (i.e., flip all
the bits of Xn). Then inf xˆ(·)E[d(X, xˆ(Y ))] = 1/2, which is the maximum distortion the adversary could incur.
The proposed scheme is hence optimal from an expected distortion point of view. However, by observing Y , the
adversary can guess Xn with probability 1/2. Moreover, they can guess it exactly with two attempts.
Similarly to expected distortion, the expected number of guesses to find Xn fails on the fourth requirement:
it can label obviously insecure systems as secure (see [25] for an example). More generally, rate-distortion-based
approaches do not meet the second requirement (R2): they assume there is a known distortion function, and in some
cases a particular distortion level, up to which the adversary is interested in reproducing the sensitive information
X .
B. Contributions
We introduce a new metric, maximal leakage, that meets all the above requirements. To do so, we first describe
a threat model that captures the side-channel setup.
Threat model. We assume the adversary is interested in a (possibly randomized) function of X , called U . We
restrict U to be discrete, which captures most scenarios of interest (in the side-channel examples above, all functions
of interest are discrete, e.g., a password, a message, an identity, etc). However, PU |X is unknown to the system
designer. This models the case in which we do not know the adversary’s function of interest, and wish to account
for a large family of potential adversaries, as in the second requirement of L (X→Y ) above. Even if it is known,
PU |X could be so complicated that it might as well be unknown. The adversary observes a random variable Y , and
the Markov chain U −X − Y holds. They wish to guess U and can verify if their guess is correct (if, say, U is
a password for a given system, then they can attempt to log in using it). Hence, they would like to maximize the
4probability of guessing U correctly. Finally, we assume the system designer accepts low risks (i.e., a random event
that reveals U is tolerable as long as it has very low probability), or that the leakage is concentrated with respect
to Y (i.e., we can average over PY , which is the case in side-channels where the input and output are running
processes).
Operational, robust measure of information leakage. We now define maximal leakage, which we denote by
L (X→Y ), as the (logarithm of the) ratio of the probability of correctly guessing U from Y to the probability of
correctly guessing U with no observation, maximized over all U satisfying U − X − Y (cf. Definition 1). The
maximization over U guarantees that our definition satisfies the requirement (R2) of making minimal assumptions
about the adversary. Moreover, the operational meaning of this quantity is clear: a leak of ` bits means that for any
U , the multiplicative increase (upon observing Y ) in the correct guessing probability is upper-bounded by, but can
be arbitrary close to, 2`.
So defined, it is not clear a priori that maximal leakage is computable, since it requires maximizing over all
auxiliary random variables U . A standard approach to obtaining a computable characterization in such problems is to
bound the necessary alphabet size for U in terms of the alphabet size of X using Carathéodory’s theorem (e.g., [26,
Lemma 5.4]). This technique fails for the present problem, however: even a binary X can require arbitrarily large
U in order to approach the supremum. Nonetheless, Theorem 1 provides a simple formula for maximal leakage
for the case of discrete X and Y . In particular, it shows that L (X→Y ) is equal to the Sibson mutual information
of order infinity I∞(X;Y ) [27,28]. Consequently, maximal leakage meets our third requirement (R3) of satisfying
axiomatic properties of an information measure. That is, it is zero if and only if X and Y are independent; it
satisfies the data processing inequality; and it is additive over independent pairs {(Xi, Yi)}ni=1. Interestingly, it is
lower-bounded by I(X;Y ), indicating that mutual information underestimates leakage.
Moreover, the definition of maximal leakage is shown to be robust: the result is unaffected if the adversary
picks the function of interest U only after observing Y (cf. Theorem 2), if they only wish to approximate U
(cf. Theorem 3), if they are allowed several guesses (cf. Theorem 4), or if they wish to maximize some arbitrary
gain function (cf. Theorem 5). We also extend the notion of maximal leakage in two directions. We propose a
conditional form of maximal leakage, which attempts to answer the question: how much does Y leak about X when
Z is given? Here Z represents side information that is available to the adversary. We again provide an operational
definition in the guessing framework (cf. Definition 6), and derive a simple form for L (X→Y |Z) (cf. Theorem 6).
Moreover, we generalize the computable characterization for maximal leakage to cover a large class of random
variables and stochastic processes (cf. Theorem 7). Both the general and the conditional form retain the axiomatic
properties of a leakage measure, and are lower-bounded by mutual information and conditional mutual information,
respectively.
New insights for mechanism design. The new metric is useful to develop new mechanisms to mitigate leakage, as
well as to evaluate existing mechanisms for this purpose. A common approach in such designs is to add independent
noise to successive inputs of the system. For example, in the SSH scenario, packets could be passed through an
./M/1 queue before being sent over the network. We provide examples of such memoryless schemes to show that,
roughly speaking, they do not perform well under maximal leakage, and are outperformed by quantization-based
schemes. More concretely, we consider the Shannon cipher system with lossy communication and evaluate the
performance of an encryption scheme using maximal leakage between the source and the public message (other
works have considered this setup under different metrics [24,25,29,30]). For a discrete memoryless source, we
show that memoryless schemes are strictly suboptimal (cf. Lemma 9), whereas optimal schemes correspond to
good rate-distortion codes. Moreover, we derive a single-letter characterization of the optimal (normalized) limit
(cf. Theorems 8 and 9).
Complexity of estimating maximal leakage. The computation of maximal leakage might become intractable
for complicated schemes. For example, in the setup of multiple processes running on the same chip as described
above, what determines the information leakage between processes is the memory controller, the operation of which
might depend on many variables. Thus, we consider the problem of estimating maximal leakage from data. We
5show that this task is feasible only if we know (a lower bound on) the minimum strictly positive probability of a
symbol x ∈ X , denoted by θ. More specifically, we show that the number of samples needed to estimate L (X→Y )
up to −additive-accuracy is Ω (|Y|/(θ log |Y|)) (cf. Theorem 10). Note that the lower bound diverges to infinity
as θ tends to zero. On the other hand, we show that O
( |Y| log |X |
θ
)
samples are sufficient (cf. Theorem 11). This
suggests that we should take into account amenability to analysis while designing leakage-mitigating mechanisms.
Guessing framework to interpret leakage measures. Finally, we use the guessing framework used to define
maximal leakage to give new operational interpretations for different information leakage measures. This provides
a common framework with which to compare them, and elucidates in which setups each should be used. More
specifically, we study the following commonly used metrics: Shannon capacity, local differential privacy [31], and
maximal correlation [32].
We show that
1) Shannon capacity captures the multiplicative increase of the probability of correct guessing over the
restricted set of functions of X that can be reliably reconstructed from Y , hence underestimating leakage
(cf. Theorem 12);
2) Local differential privacy captures the multiplicative increase of the guessing probability of functions of
randomized X , maximized over realizations of Y and over distributions PX (cf. Theorem 14); Moreover,
maximizing over realizations of Y for a fixed PX yields the maximum information rate (cf. Theorem 13);
3) Maximal correlation captures the multiplicative change in the variance of functions of X , rather than the
guessing probability (cf. Theorem 16). We extend this last notion to a new measure we call maximal cost
leakage (cf. Definition 11), which captures the worst-case multiplicative reduction over all cost functions
defined on any hidden variable U .
C. Related Work
Calmon et al. [33] and Li and El Gamal [32] use maximal correlation, ρm(X;Y ), as a secrecy measure (Calmon
et al. also generalize it to k-correlation, which is defined as the sum of the k largest principal inertial components
of the joint distribution PXY ). A key motivating result [34, Theorem 9] shows that maximal correlation bounds
the additive increase in the correct guessing probability of any deterministic function of X . Although ρm(X;Y )
is zero only if X and Y are independent, the correct guessing probability of any deterministic function might be
unchanged even if X and Y are not independent, as illustrated in the following example.
Example 3: Suppose PXY satisfies the following condition: there exists x? ∈ X such that for all y ∈ Y ,
PX|Y (x?|y) ≥ 1/2. Then for any deterministic function f , f(x?) is the adversary’s best guess for f(X), both with
and without the observation of Y . Hence, observing Y does not affect the probability of guessing any deterministic
function of X . Note, however, that X and Y may be dependent.
The literature on leakage and privacy measures extends beyond information theory to computer security and
computer science more generally. The closest to our work in fact comes from computer security [22,35]–[38]. In
particular, Smith [22] defines leakage from X to Y as the logarithm of the multiplicative increase, upon observing
Y , of the probability of guessing X itself correctly, neglecting that the adversary might be interested in certain
functions of X . Braun et al. [35] consider a worst case modification of the metric, and maximize the previous
quantity over all distributions on the alphabet of X (while PY |X is fixed). The resulting quantity turns out to equal
L (X→Y )—it is called “maximal leakage” in the computer security literature as well. It is denoted by ML(PY |X),
and its properties were further studied by Espinoza and Smith [37] and Alvim et al. [36]. The latter also define
g-leakage by introducing a gain function g : X × Xˆ → [0, 1] and considering the normalized maximal gain (for g).
Alvim et al. [38] consider several variants of g-leakage (i.e., additive or multiplicative increase, fixing or maximizing
over the marginal PX , etc). They show that maximizing g-leakage over gain functions g yields maximal leakage.
However, no operational significance is attached to the g that achieves the maximum. Moreover, the result is given
only as one of many possible computable variations of leakage [38,39].
6Another connected line of work stems from cryptography, and in particular from the notion of semantic
security [40] which considers the security of encryption schemes. Goldwasser and Micali [40] define the “advantage”
for a given function of the messages as the additive increase of the correct guessing probability upon observing
the encrypted message (i.e., the ciphertext). Semantic security then requires that, for an adversary that can work
only for a polynomial (in the length of the message) amount of time, the advantage is negligible for all input
distributions and for all deterministic functions that are computable in polynomial time.
There are several variants of semantic security. In particular, entropic security [41,42] drops the computational
bounds (on the adversary and the considered functions), but restricts its attention to input distributions with
high min-entropy. Bellare et al. [43] introduce semantic security to the wiretap channel, and do not restrict it
to computationally-bounded adversaries or to deterministic polynomial-time computable functions. For a given
encryption scheme, they then upper and lower-bound the advantage of semantic security in terms of “mutual
information security advantage”, which is defined as the maximum, over all input distributions, of the mutual
information between the message and the output of the channel whose input is the encryption of the message. For
further discussion of leakage metrics, we refer the reader to Wagner and Eckhoff’s work [44], which categorizes
over eighty such metrics.
D. Outline
We describe our threat model and define maximal leakage in Section II. We also give a closed-form expression
of maximal leakage (for discrete X and Y ), discuss its properties, and compare it to related leakage metrics. In
Section III, we prove the robustness of our definition by considering several variations on the setup, and show
that they all lead to the same quantity. Furthermore, we generalize the formula of maximal leakage and analyze
a simple model of the SSH side-channel. We also present a conditional form of maximal leakage. In Section IV,
we consider the Shannon cipher system and derive (asymptotically) optimal schemes. We show that memoryless
schemes are strictly suboptimal in general. We study the complexity of estimating maximal leakage from data
in Section V. Finally, in Section VI, we use the guessing framework to give new operational interpretations for
common information leakage metrics, and we introduce a cost-based notion of leakage.
II. MAXIMAL LEAKAGE
Let X be a random variable representing sensitive information, and Y be the output of a side-channel the input
of which is X . To give an operational definition of information leakage between X and Y , we specify a threat
model as follows.
• The adversary is interested in a possibly randomized, discrete function of X called U .
• The adversary observes Y and the Markov chain U −X − Y holds.
• The adversary wishes to guess U and can verify if the guess is correct.
• The distribution PU |X is unknown to the system designer.
• From the system designer’s viewpoint, if the probability of guessing U correctly is high for some realizations
of Y , then it suffices that the probability of such realizations is suitably small.
To clarify our model, consider how it applies to the SSH side-channel. In this case, X represents the nominal packet
timings. Suppose we perturb the packet timings before sending them over the network, in which case Y represents
the post-perturbation timings observed by the adversary. U corresponds to the input of the user, e.g., their password.
The adversary wishes to guess U (e.g., the password) and can verify their guess (e.g., by attempting to log into
the system). So they wish to maximize the probability that the guess is correct, and the system designer wishes
to minimize it. The distribution of passwords given packet timings is complicated, so we assume it is unknown to
the system designer. Finally, the system designer only requires the probability that the system is compromised to
be small.
One might be tempted to restrict the range of U to deterministic functions of X . However, this is too restrictive
as implied by Example 3 in the introduction. Moreover, in most side-channel examples we mentioned, the U of
7interest is a randomized function of X (passwords given packet timings, key values given memory access patterns,
political affiliation given location traces, etc). On the other hand, the restriction to discrete U ’s still captures most
scenarios of interest, as in the above examples. Indeed even when X represents location traces, for instance, the
U of interest is typically discrete, e.g., home/work address, political affiliation, etc. Finally, assuming PU |X is
unknown allows us to take into account a wide range of adversaries having different objectives. That is, as in our
requirement (R2), we do not assume we know the function of interest to the adversary.
We are now ready to present the definition of maximal leakage. Since the adversary wishes to guess U , we
consider the maximum advantage in the probability of guessing U from Y , as compared with guessing with no
observations. Maximal leakage captures the maximum advantage over all U ’s as in the following definition.
Definition 1 (Maximal Leakage): Given a joint distribution PXY on alphabets X and Y , the maximal leakage
from X to Y is defined as
L (X→Y ) = sup
U−X−Y−Uˆ
log
Pr
(
U = Uˆ
)
maxu∈U PU (u)
, (1)
where the supremum is over all U and Uˆ taking values in the same finite, but arbitrary, alphabet.
Remark 1: log is the natural logarithm so L (X→Y ) is in nats. Using log2 instead gives an answer in bits.
The guarantee that a small leakage provides is as follows. Whatever function U the adversary is interested in,
if L (X→Y ) ≤ `, then supuˆ(·)Pr (U = uˆ(Y )) ≤ e` maxu PU (u). Note that the upper bound can be decomposed
into two quantities: maxu PU (u) which is completely outside the control of the system designer, and e` which
is determined by the designer’s choice of PY |X (which is typically subject to quality constraints related to the
performance of the underlying system). Moreover, the definition directly implies several important properties of
maximal leakage.
Lemma 1: For any joint distribution PXY on alphabets X and Y ,
1) (Data Processing Inequality) If the Markov chain X−Y −Z holds, L (X→Z) ≤ min{L (X→Y ) ,L (Y→Z)}.
2) If Y is discrete, L (X→Y ) ≤ log |supp(Y )|.
3) If X is discrete, L (X→Y ) ≤ log |supp(X)|.
4) L (X→Y ) ≥ 0 with equality if X and Y are independent.
The proof is given in Appendix A-A. Note that properties 1) and 4) were two of our axioms for a leakage measure
(R3). Properties 2) and 3) are consistent with intuitive understanding of information. In particular, a binary variable
Y cannot leak more than one bit about any variable X . Similarly, a binary variable X has no more than one bit
of information to be leaked.
Despite the useful properties of the definition, it involves an infinite-dimensional optimization problem, so it is
not clear a priori that it is computable. In fact, one can show that it is impossible to bound the cardinality of the
alphabet U in terms of the cardinalities of the alphabets X and Y . Nonetheless, we can show that maximal leakage
is indeed computable and actually takes a simple form. We focus first on the discrete case and consider general
alphabets later.
Theorem 1: For any joint distribution PXY on finite alphabets X and Y , the maximal leakage from X to Y is
given by the Sibson mutual information of order infinity, I∞(X;Y ). That is,
L (X→Y ) = log
∑
y∈Y
max
x∈X :
PX(x)>0
PY |X(y|x) = I∞(X;Y ).
Remark 2: Sibson’s mutual information [27,28] of order α (α ≥ 0, α 6= 1), which can be expressed (in the
discrete case) as
Iα(X;Y ) = inf
QY
Dα(PXY ||PX ×QY ) (2)
8where
Dα(P ||Q) = 1
α− 1 log
(∑
a
Pα(a)Q1−α(a)
)
, (3)
is one of several suggested extensions of the concept of Renyi entropy Hα(X) (itself an extension of entropy)
and Renyi divergence Dα(P ||Q). Verdú [28] argues for the adoption of Sibson’s extension, and the above result
supports that choice by providing an operational interpretation of
I∞(X;Y ) = lim
α→∞ Iα(X;Y ) (4)
= inf
QY
D∞(PXY ||PX ×QY ), (5)
where
D∞(P ||Q) = lim
α→∞Dα(P ||Q) (6)
= log
(
sup
a
P (a)
Q(a)
)
(7)
and the interchange of the limit and infimum in (4) and (5) is implied by [45, Theorem 4] (see also (122) to follow).
Before proving the theorem, we investigate some of its consequences. First, it reveals two of the more useful aspects
of maximal leakage from an engineering perspective: minimizing L(X→Y ) over PY |X , for a fixed support of PX ,
amounts to minimizing a convex function, and L(X→Y ) depends on PX only through its support. The latter fact
is very useful because in practice PX is typically complicated and outside our control. PX is also typically used to
model the adversary’s prior knowledge of X , which is not necessarily known to us. The following corollary (the
proof of which is given in Appendix A-B) summarizes some useful properties of L (X→Y ).
Corollary 1: For any joint distribution PXY on finite alphabets X and Y ,
1) L (X→Y ) = 0 iff X and Y are independent.
2) (Additivity) If {(Xi, Yi)}ni=1 are mutually independent, then
L (Xn→Y n) =
n∑
i=1
L (Xi→Yi) .
3) L (X→Y ) = log |X | iff X is a deterministic function of Y (assuming X has full support).
4) L (X→X) = H0(X) = log |supp(X)|.
5) L (X→Y ) is not symmetric in X and Y .
6) exp{L (X→Y )} is convex in PY |X for fixed support of PX .
7) L (X→Y ) is concave in PX for fixed PY |X .
Note that properties 1) and 2) along with the data processing inequality are the axioms we stated in (R3).
Property 5) reveals a potential “weakness” in some suggested leakage metrics, including mutual information. In
particular, there is no reason to expect a priori that X leaks about Y as much as Y leaks about X . Therefore,
metrics that are symmetric by design miss that fact (this is in contrast with Rényi’s axiom that a dependence
measure should be symmetric [46]). Finally, property 6) shows that minimizing maximal leakage, for a fixed
support of PX , amounts to minimizing a convex function. That is, one can efficiently solve the problem of finding
the randomization mechanism PY |X that minimizes maximal leakage, subject to a convex constraint.
We evaluate L (X→Y ) for some special cases.
Example 4: If X ∼ Ber(q), 0 < q < 1, and Y is the output of a BSC with parameter p, 0 ≤ p ≤ 1/2, then
L (X→Y ) = log(2(1− p)).
Example 5: If X ∼ Ber(q), 0 < q < 1, and Y is the output of a BEC with parameter , 0 ≤  < 1, then
L (X→Y ) = log(2− ), and L(Y→X) = log 2.
9Example 6: For any deterministic law PY |X , L (X→Y ) = log |supp(Y )|.
Consider the examples from the introduction that showed that expected distortion and mutual information do not
meet our fourth requirement (R4).
Example 7 (cf. Example 2): Given n ∈ N, let Xn be i.i.d ∼ Ber(1/2) and let K ∼ Ber(1/2) be independent of
Xn. Let PY |Xn be as follows: if K = 0, Y = Xn; otherwise, Y = X¯n (i.e., flip all the bits of Xn). This scheme is
optimal from an expected Hamming distortion viewpoint. On the other hand, L (Xn→Y n) = (n− 1) log 2, which
is exactly describing that we know Xn up to 1 bit.
Example 8 (cf. Example 1): Given n ∈ N, let X = {0, 1}8n and X ∼ Unif(X ). Now consider the following
two conditional distributions:
PY |X =
{
X, if X mod 8 = 0,
1, otherwise.
and PZ|X = (X1, X2, . . . , Xn+1).
Then L (X→Y ) = log(28n−3 +1) > L (X→Z) = (n+1) log 2, whereas I(X;Y ) ≈ (n+0.169) log 2 < I(X;Z) =
(n+ 1) log 2.
In the next section, we elaborate on the comparison between mutual information and maximal leakage. We also
comment on the relation to the computer security and computer science literature, before proving Theorem 1 in
Section II-B.
A. Comparison with Related Metrics
1) Mutual Information: We first compare maximal leakage with mutual information in the following lemma. It
shows that L (X→Y ) upper-bounds I(X;Y ), and no scalar multiple of I(X;Y ) can upper-bound L (X→Y ).
Lemma 2: For any joint distribution PXY on finite alphabets X and Y , L (X→Y ) ≥ I(X;Y ). Moreover, for
any c > 0, there exists PXY such that L (X→Y ) ≥ cI(X;Y ). Furthermore. L (X→Y ) = I(X;Y ) if and only if
1) If PXY (x, y) > 0 and PXY (x′, y) > 0, then PY |X(y|x) = PY |X(y|x′).
2) For all y, y′ ∈ supp(Y ), ∑
x:PXY (x,y)>0
PX(x) =
∑
x′:PXY (x′,y′)>0
PX(x
′).
Remark 3: A joint distribution satisfying condition 1) is called singular [47]. Moreover, if X has full support,
L (X→Y ) = I(X;Y )⇒ L (X→Y ) = C(PY |X).
Proof: That I∞(X;Y ) ≥ I(X;Y ) is already known [27,28]. For the stronger statement, it suffices to show it
for binary X and Y . To that end, let X ∼ Ber(1/2) and let PY |X be a BSC with parameter p ∈ (0, 1/2). Then
L (X→Y ) = log(2(1−p)) and I(X;Y ) = log 2−H(p) (where the entropy function is computed using the natural
logarithm). One can readily verify that
lim
p→1/2
log(2(1− p))
log 2−H(p) = +∞.
The conditions for equality can be readily verified, and are included in Appendix A-C for completeness.
The lemma shows that a small maximal leakage is a more stringent requirement than a small mutual information.
Since L (X→Y ) depends on PX only through its support, it follows that maximal leakage is at least the Shannon
capacity of the channel PY |X when X has full support, and this inequality can be strict (as in the BSC example in
the proof of the lemma). This justifies the claim in the introduction that the Shannon capacity of a side-channel does
not necessarily upper-bound its leakage. The maximization in the definition of maximal leakage hints at the reason
why. In particular, Shannon capacity is concerned with (the size of) message sets that can be reliably reconstructed
at the receiver, i.e., Pr(U = Uˆ(Y )) ≥ 1 −  for some small . Leakage, on the other hand, is concerned with
the advantage in guessing, without any notion of reliability. This observation is made mathematically precise in
Section VI-A. On the other hand, local differential privacy [31], which some regard as too pessimistic (e.g., [31]),
does upper-bound maximal leakage. This is further explored in Section VI-C.
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2) g-leakage: For discrete X and Y , Braun et al. [35] define leakage as follows
ML(PY |X) = sup
PX
supX−Y−Xˆ Pr(X = Xˆ)
maxx∈X PX(x)
. (8)
This definition assumes the adversary wishes to guess X itself, and hence does not meet our second requirement
(R2). However, it is equal to L (X→Y ) when X has full support. Alvim et al. [36] define g-leakage by introducing
a gain function g : X × Xˆ → [0, 1], where Xˆ is a finite set. Then
MLg(PX , PY |X) =
supX−Y−Xˆ E[g(X, Xˆ)]
maxxˆ∈Xˆ E[g(X, xˆ)]
. (9)
It is shown [38] that
sup
Xˆ ,g:X×Xˆ→[0,1]
MLg(PX , PY |X) = L (X→Y ) . (10)
This definition however does not explicitly account for random functions of X , whereas we have seen that in
many cases the adversary could be interested in a hidden random variable U . Moreover, there is no operational
interpretation attached to the g that achieves the maximum. Nonetheless, these metrics are quite similar to the one
introduced here.
3) Semantic Security: The semantic and entropic security literature [40]–[42] consider the difference between the
guessing probabilities as opposed to the ratio considered in Definition 1. Since U ’s of interest, such as passwords,
are typically hard to guess (i.e., maxu PU (u) is small), the ratio is arguably the more appropriate measure of the
change. It is also the more natural choice when viewing leakage in terms of leaked bits. Nevertheless, the following
simple argument bounds the maximum difference in terms of maximal leakage.
Lemma 3: For any joint distribution PXY on alphabets X and Y ,
sup
U :U−X−Y
(
sup
uˆ(·)
Pr(U = uˆ(Y ))−max
u∈U
PU (u)
)
≤ 1− e−L(X→Y ),
where the supremum is over all U taking values in a finite, but arbitrary, alphabet.
Proof: Consider any U satisfying U −X − Y . Then
supuˆ(·)Pr(U = uˆ(Y ))
maxu∈U PU (u)
≤ eL(X→Y ).
Hence,
sup
uˆ(·)
Pr(U = uˆ(Y ))−max
u∈U
PU (u) ≤
(
sup
uˆ(·)
Pr(U = uˆ(Y ))
)(
1− e−L(X→Y )
)
≤ 1− e−L(X→Y ).
This bound is nontrivial when maxu PU (u) < e−L(X→Y ), i.e., H∞(U) > L (X→Y ). It is worth noting that
Alvim et al. showed that
sup
Xˆ ,g:X×Xˆ→R
(
sup
X−Y−Xˆ
E[g(X, Xˆ)]−max
xˆ∈Xˆ
E[g(X, xˆ)]
)
,
where g is “1-spanning” [38, Definition 3], can be efficiently computed [38, Theorem 17, Corollary 18]. On the
other hand, for a given threshold t, it is NP-hard [38, Theorem 11] to decide whether
sup
PX
(
sup
xˆ(·)
Pr(X = xˆ(Y ))−max
x∈X
PX(x)
)
≥ t. (11)
Lemma 3, however, gives a simple bound on the latter quantity.
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B. Proof of Theorem 1
Assume, without loss of generality, that PX(x) > 0 for all x ∈ X . To show that L (X→Y ) ≤ I∞(X;Y ), consider
any U satisfying U −X − Y . Define
L (X→Y ) [U ] = log
∑
y∈Y maxu∈U PUY (u, y)
maxu∈U PU (u)
, (12)
so that L (X→Y ) = supU :U−X−Y L (X→Y ) [U ]. Then∑
y∈Y
max
u∈U
PUY (u, y) =
∑
y∈Y
max
u∈U
∑
x∈X
PX(x)PU |X(u|x)PY |X(y|x)
≤
∑
y∈Y
max
u∈U
∑
x∈X
PX(x)PU |X(u|x) max
x′∈X
PY |X(y|x′)
=
∑
y∈Y
(
max
x′∈X
PY |X(y|x′)
)
max
u∈U
∑
x∈X
PX(x)PU |X(u|x)
=
∑
y∈Y
max
x∈X
PY |X(y|x) max
u∈U
PU (u).
Therefore, L (X→Y ) [U ] ≤ I∞(X;Y ) for all PU |X , hence L (X→Y ) ≤ I∞(X;Y ).
For the reverse inequality, we construct a PU |X for which L (X→Y ) [U ] = I∞(X;Y ), which we will call
the “shattering” PU |X . To that end, let p? = minx∈X PX(x). For each x ∈ X , let k(x) = PX(x)/p?, and let
U = ⋃x∈X {(x, 1), (x, 2), . . . , (x, dk(x)e)}. For each u = (iu, ju) ∈ U and x ∈ X , let PU |X(u|x) be:
PU |X((iu, ju)|x) =

p?
PX(x)
, iu = x, 1 ≤ ju ≤ bk(x)c,
1− (dk(x)e−1)p?PX(x) , iu = x, ju = dk(x)e,
0, iu 6= x, 1 ≤ ju ≤ dk(iu)e.
(13)
It is easy to check that if bk(x)c = dk(x)e, then the corresponding formulas are equal. Then, for each ((iu, ju), x) ∈
U × X ,
PUX((iu, ju), x) =

p?, iu = x, 1 ≤ ju ≤ bk(x)c,
PX(x)− (dk(x)e − 1)p?, iu = x, ju = dk(x)e,
0, iu 6= x, 1 ≤ ju ≤ dk(iu)e.
(14)
Note that the supports of PU |X=x is disjoint for each distinct x, and it effectively “shatters” x into shards of
probability p?. Now note that
max
u∈U
PU (u) = max
(iu,ju)∈U
PUX((iu, ju), iu) = p
?. (15)
Now consider any (u, y) ∈ U × Y . We have
PUY ((iu, ju), y) =
∑
x∈X
PX(x)PU |X((iu, ju)|x)PY |X(y|x)
= PX(iu)PU |X((iu, ju)|iu)PY |X(y|iu)
=
{
p?PY |X(y|iu), 1 ≤ ju ≤ bk(iu)c,
(PX(x)− (dk(x)e − 1)p?)PY |X(y|iu), ju = dk(iu)e.
(16)
Then, for a given y ∈ Y ,
max
(iu,ju)∈U
PUY ((iu, ju), y) = max
(iu,1)∈U
p?PY |X(y|iu) = max
x∈X
p?PY |X(y|x). (17)
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Finally, we get
L (X→Y ) ≥ L (X→Y ) [U ] = log
∑
y∈Y
max
x∈X
PY |X(y|x),
where the inequality follows from the definition, and the equality follows from equations (12), (15), and (17). 
Note that in the above proof, the conditional distribution (given in (13)) that achieves the supremum in (1)
depends on PXY only through the X−marginal, PX . So we get the following proposition.
Proposition 4: Let X be a finite alphabet and PX a distribution on X . Then the “shattering” PU |X defined
in (13) achieves the supremum in (1) for all finite alphabets Y and conditional distributions PY |X .
III. MAXIMAL LEAKAGE: VARIATIONS AND EXTENSIONS
We now consider several natural variations to our threat model. In particular, we consider the following scenarios.
1) The adversary chooses the variable of interest U after observing Y , i.e., for different realizations of Y , they
might attempt to guess different functions of X .
2) The adversary only needs their guess to be within a certain distance of the true value of U .
3) The adversary can make several guesses.
4) The adversary attempts to maximize a gain function defined on U × Uˆ for some alphabet Uˆ .
We modify the definition of maximal leakage accordingly for each scenario. However, for each of these cases, the
resulting computable characterization is unchanged. This shows that the definition of maximal leakage is robust, and
meets the requirements we presented in the introduction. In particular, it has several useful operational interpretations,
and it requires minimal assumptions about the adversary’s goal.
Furthermore, we extend the notion of maximal leakage in two directions. First, we propose a conditional form
of leakage L (X→Y |Z), where Z represents side information available at the adversary. Finally, we generalize
Theorem 1 to account for a large class of random variables, including point processes. We use the general formula
to analyze a simple model of the SSH side-channel.
A. Multiple Functions of Interest
In our threat model, we assumed that the adversary is interested in a specific randomized function of X . However,
they could be interested in several functions and choose which one to guess only after seeing the realization of Y .
To account for this, we modify the definition of maximal leakage as follows.
Definition 2 (Opportunistic Maximal Leakage): Given a joint distribution PXY on alphabets X and Y , define
L˜ (X→Y ) = log
∑
y∈Y
PY (y) sup
U :U−X−Y
maxu∈U PU |Y (u|y)
maxu∈U PU (u)
(18)
= sup
(Uy,y∈Y)−X−Y
log
∑
y∈Y
PY (y)
maxu∈Uy PUy|Y (u|y)
maxu∈Uy PUy(u)
(19)
= sup
U
log
∑
y∈Y
PY (y)
maxu∈U
∑
x∈X PU |X,Y (u|x, y)PX|Y (x|y)
maxu∈U
∑
x∈X PU |X,Y (u|x, y)PX(x)
, (20)
where the U variables in all three suprema take values in finite but arbitrary alphabets.
The different Uy, y ∈ Y in (19) can be interpreted as different secrets that the adversary might attempt to guess. The
adversary opportunistically attempts to guess secret Uy when it observes Y = y. Notably, allowing the adversary
this additional freedom does not change the result.
Theorem 2: For any joint distribution PXY on finite alphabets X and Y ,
L (X→Y ) = L˜ (X→Y ) .
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Proof: It follows straightforwardly from the definitions that L˜ (X→Y ) ≥ L (X→Y ). For the reverse direction,
consider the following proposition.
Proposition 5: Suppose U , X , and Y are discrete random variables that satisfy the Markov chain U −X − Y .
Then for each y ∈ supp(Y ),
maxu∈U PU |Y (u|y)
maxu∈U PU (u)
≤ maxx:PX|Y (x|y)>0 PY |X(y|x)
PY (y)
.
It follows from the proposition that
exp{L˜ (X→Y )} ≤
∑
y∈supp(Y )
max
x:PX|Y (x|y)>0
PY |X(y|x) ≤
∑
y∈Y
max
x:PX(x)>0
PY |X(y|x).
Then it remains to prove Proposition 5. To that end, consider a triple of discrete random variables U , X , and Y
satisfying U −X − Y , and fix y ∈ supp(Y ). Then
max
u∈U
PU |Y (u|y) = max
u∈U
∑
x:PX|Y (x|y)>0
PU |X(u|x)PX|Y (x|y)
= max
u∈U
∑
x:PX|Y (x|y)>0
PU |X(u|x)PX(x)
PY |X(y|x)
PY (y)
≤ max
x′:PX|Y (x′|y)>0
PY |X(y|x′)
PY (y)
max
u∈U
∑
x:PX|Y (x|y)>0
PUX(u, x)
≤ max
x′:PX|Y (x′|y)>0
PY |X(y|x′)
PY (y)
max
u∈U
PU (u),
as desired.
B. Approximate Guessing
Consider the case in which the adversary only needs the guess to be within a certain distance of the true function
value, according to a given distance metric. As such, the random variable U , over which we are optimizing, now
lives in a given metric space U and is no longer restricted to be discrete. We call this modified measure maximal
locational leakage. The term “locational” is motivated by the scenario in which the variable of interest U is a
geographical location, such as a person’s home address (potentially revealed by GPS traces [48]) or a person’s
physical location (potentially revealed by cellular tracking data [8]).
Definition 3 (Maximal Locational Leakage): Given a joint distribution PXY on finite alphabets X and Y , and a
metric space U (with its associated Borel σ-field), the maximal locational leakage from X to Y is defined as
LU (X→Y ) = sup
U :U−X−Y
∃u:Pr(U∈B(u))>0
log
supuˆ(·)Pr(U ∈ B(uˆ(Y )))
supuˆPr(U ∈ B(uˆ))
, (21)
where B(u) is the closed unit ball centered at u ∈ U .
Theorem 3: For any joint distribution PXY on finite alphabets X and Y , and any metric space U ,
LU (X→Y ) ≤ L(X→Y ),
with equality if U has a countably infinite subset S such that no pair of its elements can be contained in a single
unit ball.
Proof: Assume, without loss of generality, that X has full support. Now consider any U and uˆ(Y ) in the
maximization of (21):
Pr(U ∈ B(uˆ(Y )) ≤
∑
y∈Y
sup
u∈U
P (U ∈ B(u), Y = y)
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=
∑
y∈Y
sup
u∈U
∑
x∈X
P (U ∈ B(u), X = x, Y = y)
=
∑
y∈Y
sup
u∈U
∑
x∈X
P (U ∈ B(u))P (X = x|U ∈ B(u))PY |X(y|x)
≤
∑
y∈Y
sup
u∈U
P (U ∈ B(u)) sup
x∈X
PY |X(y|x)
=
∑
y∈Y
sup
x∈X
PY |X(y|x)
 sup
u∈U
P (U ∈ B(u)).
Therefore,
LU (X→Y ) ≤ log
∑
y∈Y
sup
x∈X
PY |X(y|x) = L(X→Y ).
If U satisfies the given condition (e.g., U is unbounded), then exact guessing of discrete functions can be simulated
by choosing S to be the support of U . Hence LU (X→Y ) ≥ L(X→Y ), which implies the equality.
C. Multiple Guesses
The definition of maximal leakage (Definition 1) allowed the adversary a single guess. However, an adversary
might be able to make several guesses in some practical scenarios. For example, if the adversary is trying to guess
a password U of some system, they can typically try several passwords before they are locked out. Similarly, if
they are trying to guess a secret key to decrypt an encrypted message, they can make several attempts. We modify
the definition to allow for k guesses, for any integer k, as follows.
Definition 4 (k-Maximal Leakage): Given a joint distribution PXY on finite alphabets X and Y , and a positive
integer k, the k-maximal leakage from X to Y is defined as
L(k) (X→Y ) = sup
U−X−Y−(Uˆi)ki=1
log
Pr
(∨k
i=1 U = Uˆi
)
max S⊆U
|S|≤k
PU (S)
,
where U takes values in a finite, but arbitrary, alphabet.
It turns out that k-maximal leakage and maximal leakage are equivalent.
Theorem 4: For any joint distribution PXY on finite alphabets X and Y , and any k ∈ N,
L(k) (X→Y ) = L (X→Y ) .
The proof is given in Appendix B-A.
D. General Gains
We now consider the case in which different realizations of U might have different significance for the adversary.
For example, an adversary monitoring the timing of packet transmissions over a given network [49] might seek
to deduce source-destination pairs. However, they might be more interested in detecting communication between
specific pairs, corresponding to (say) suspicious persons, governmental agencies, etc. Hence, there is more value
to the detection of the existence of a link, rather than its absence. This mirrors the asymmetric cost of false alarm
and missed detection in hypothesis testing. To account for this, we use a gain function g : U × Uˆ → [0,∞) and
maximize over gain functions as follows.
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Definition 5 (Maximal Gain Leakage): Given a joint distribution PXY on finite alphabets X and Y , the maximal
gain leakage is defined as
LG (X→Y ) = sup
U :U−X−Y
Uˆ ,g:U×Uˆ→[0,∞):
supuˆE[g(U,uˆ)]>0
log
supuˆ(·)E[g(U, uˆ(Y ))]
supuˆE[g(U, uˆ)]
,
where U is a finite, but arbitrary, alphabet.
Similarly to previous variations, maximal gain leakage turns out to be equivalent to maximal leakage.
Theorem 5: For any joint distribution PXY on finite alphabets X and Y ,
L (X→Y ) = LG (X→Y ) .
Remark 4: For a similar result in which U = X but one takes the supremum over all X distributions, see Alvim
et al. [38].
Proof: It follows straightforwardly from the definitions that LG (X→Y ) ≥ L (X→Y ). For the reverse direction,
consider any U satisfying U −X − Y , any (non-empty) set Uˆ and function g : U × Uˆ → [0,∞). Then
sup
uˆ(·)
E[g(U, uˆ(Y ))] =
∑
y∈Y
sup
uˆ∈Uˆ
∑
u∈U
g(u, uˆ)PUY (u, y)
=
∑
y∈Y
sup
uˆ∈Uˆ
∑
u∈U
∑
x∈supp(X)
g(u, uˆ)PX(x)PU |X(u|x)PY |X(y|x)
≤
∑
y∈Y
(
max
x′∈supp(X)
PY |X(y|x′)
)
sup
uˆ∈Uˆ
∑
u∈U
∑
x∈supp(X)
g(u, uˆ)PX(x)PU |X(u|x)
=
∑
y∈Y
(
max
x′∈supp(X)
PY |X(y|x′)
)
sup
uˆ
E[g(U, uˆ)],
as desired.
E. Conditional Maximal Leakage
One of the main challenges in information leakage problems comes from the fact that the adversary can acquire
information from multiple sources. This prompted researchers in database security to make very conservative
assumptions about the knowledge of the adversary: differential privacy is introduced in a setup in which the adversary
knows all the entries of the database except one [50]. This also raises interest in the behavior of mechanisms under
composition [51]. That is, if the adversary receives multiple independent observations released by a given secure
mechanism, how do the security guarantees degrade? In order to answer these questions, we propose a conditional
form of maximal leakage, which is defined analogously to Definition 1.
Definition 6 (Conditional Maximal Leakage): Given a joint distribution PXY Z on alphabets X , Y and Z , the
conditional maximal leakage from X to Y given Z is defined as
L (X→Y |Z) = sup
U :U−X−Y |Z
log
Pr(U = Uˆ(Y,Z))
Pr(U = U˜(Z))
, (22)
where U takes values in a finite, but arbitrary, alphabet, and Uˆ(Y,Z) and U˜(Z) are the optimal (i.e., MAP)
estimators of U given (Y, Z) and Z, respectively.
Remark 5: The Markov chain U − X − Y |Z is equivalent to U − (X,Z) − Y . The above definition is hence
conservative, in that it allows the channel from X to U to depend on Z. One could instead consider Us satisfying
the Markov chain U −X − (Y,Z). The quantity so modified appears to be considerably more difficult to analyze.
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Theorem 6: Given a joint distribution PXY Z on finite alphabets X , Y and Z , the conditional maximal leakage
from X to Y given Z is given by
L (X→Y |Z) = log
(
max
z:PZ(z)>0
∑
y
max
x:PX|Z(x|z)>0
PY |XZ(y|x, z)
)
. (23)
In other terms, L (X→Y |Z) = maxz∈supp(Z) L(X→Y |Z = z), where L(X→Y |Z = z) is interpreted as the
unconditional maximal leakage evaluated with respect to the joint distribution PXY |Z=z . The following corollary
summarizes important properties of conditional maximal leakage.
Corollary 2: Given a joint distribution PXY Z on finite alphabets X , Y and Z ,
1) (Data Processing Inequality) If the Markov chain X−Y −V |Z holds for a discrete random variable V , then
L (X→V |Z) ≤ min{L (X→Y |Z) ,L (Y→V |Z)}.
2) L (X→Y |Z) ≤ min{log |X |, log |Y|}.
3) L (X→Y |Z) = 0 iff X − Z − Y holds.
4) (Additivity) If {(Xi, Yi, Zi)}ni=1 are mutually independent, then
L (Xn1→Y n1 |Zn1 ) =
n∑
i=1
L (Xi→Yi|Zi) .
5) L (X→Y |Z) ≥ I(X;Y |Z).
6) L (X→Y |Z) is not symmetric in X and Y .
7) If Z −X − Y holds, then
L (X→Y |Z) ≤ L (X→Y ) ,
with equality if for some z ∈ supp(Z), supp(PX|Z=z) = supp(PX).
8) L (X→(Y,Z)) ≤ L (X→Z) + L (X→Y |Z) .
Similarly to maximal leakage, properties 1)-4) can be seen as axiomatic for a conditional leakage metric. Property
5) is analogous to the relationship between maximal leakage and mutual information. Property 7) is interesting in
that it exhibits a behavior similar to mutual information. Indeed, if Z −X − Y holds, then I(X;Y |Z) ≤ I(X;Y ).
Property 8) can be viewed as a one-sided chain rule. A simple consequence of properties 7) and 8) is the following
composition lemma.
Lemma 6 (Composition Lemma): Given a joint distribution PXY Z on finite alphabets X , Y and Z , if Z−X−Y
holds, then
L (X→(Y,Z)) ≤ L (X→Z) + L (X→Y ) .
Hence, if an adversary has access to side information Z and this is not known to the system designer (which is
often the case in practice), then minimizing L (X→Y ) (irrespective of Z) is still a reasonable objective.
The proofs of Theorem 6 and Corollary 2 are given in Appendices B-B and B-C, respectively.
F. General Alphabets
Finally, we generalize Theorem 1 to allow for a large class of random variables and stochastic processes. We use
the general formula to study a simple model of the SSH side-channel and analyze the performance of commonly
used mechanisms. Our analysis suggests that memoryless schemes generally do not perform well under maximal
leakage.
Before stating the theorem for general alphabets, we introduce the following notation. For a given probability
distribution PX , and a measurable function f : X → R, the essential supremum of f with respect to PX is defined
as:
ess-supPXf(X) = inf{α : PX({x : f(x) > α}) = 0}. (24)
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Equivalently,
ess-supPXf(X) = sup{β : PX({x : f(x) > β}) > 0}. (25)
Theorem 7: Let (X ×Y, σXY , PXY ) be a probability space with associated probability spaces (X , σX , PX) and
(Y, σY , PY ), where σXY is the product sigma-algebra.
1) If PXY  PX × PY and σX is generated by a countable set, then
L (X→Y ) = log
∫
Y
ess-supPXf(X, y)PY (dy), (26)
where f(x, y) = dPXYd(PX×PY )(x, y).
2) If absolute continuity fails, then L (X→Y ) = +∞.
In the discrete case, L (X→Y ) depends on PXY only through PY |X and the support of PX . Although it is
not immediately clear from (26), this holds true in the general case in the following sense. Define an equivalence
relation on the set of probability measures on a given measurable space as follows:
P ≡ Q if P  Q and Q P. (27)
Then L (X→Y ) depends on PXY only through PY |X and the equivalence class of PX . We formalize this observation
in the following lemma.
Lemma 7: Let (X , σX , PX1) be a probability space, and let (Y, σY ) and (X ×Y, σXY ) be measurable spaces,
where σXY is the product sigma-algebra. Fix a kernel µ from X to Y , that is, a function function µ : X × σY →
[0,∞) that satisfies:
1) For every B ∈ σY , µ(·, B) is σX -measurable.
2) For every x ∈ X , µ(x, ·) is a probability measure on (Y, σY ).
Let PX1Y1 and PY1 be the probability measures induced by PX1 and µ(·, ·) on (X × Y, σXY ) and (Y, σY ),
respectively. If PX1Y1  PX1 × PY1 , then µ(x, ·) PY1 . If, in addition, σX is generated by a countable set,
L (X1→Y1) = log
∫
Y
ess-supPX1
(
dµ(X, ·)
dPY1
)
PY1(dy) = log
∫
Y
ess-supPX
(
dµ(X, ·)
dQY
)
QY (dy), (28)
where PX is an arbitrary representative of the equivalence class (cf. (27)) of PX1 and QY is any measure satisfying
PY1  QY .
Consequently, if PX2 is a probability measure on (X , σX) satisfying PX2 ≡ PX1 , then PX2Y2  PX2 × PY2 ,
PY1 ≡ PY2 , and
L (X2→Y2) = L (X1→Y1) ,
where PX2Y2 and PY2 are the induced probability measures on (X × Y, σXY ) and (Y, σY ), respectively.
The proofs of Theorem 7 and Lemma 7 are given in Appendices B-D and B-E, respectively. We now discuss
implications and examples of the theorem.
Corollary 3: Let (X × Y, σXY , PXY ) be a probability space with associated probability spaces (X , σX , PX)
and (Y, σY , PY ). Assume PXY  PX × PY and σX is generated by a countable set. Then
1) L (X→Y ) = 0 iff X and Y are independent.
2) (Additivity) If {(Xi, Yi)}ni=1 are mutually independent, then
L (Xn1→Y n1 ) =
n∑
i=1
L (Xi→Yi) .
3) L (X→Y ) ≥ I(X;Y ).
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Proof: For 3) it suffices to consider the case in which PXY  PX × PY . Let f(·, ·) denote the derivative of
PXY with respect to PX × PY and consider the following.
I(X;Y ) = E[log f(X,Y )]
(a)
≤ logE[f(X,Y )] = log
∫
Y
∫
X
f2(x, y)PX(dx)PY (dy)
≤ log
∫
Y
(
ess-supPXf(X, y)
) ∫
X
f(x, y)PX(dx)PY (dy)
(b)
= L (X→Y ) ,
where (a) follows from Jensen’s inequality, and (b) follows from the fact
∫
X f(x, y)PX(dx) = 1 Y –a.s. because∫
Y
[∫
X
f(x, y)PX(dx)
]
1(y ∈ B)PY (dy) = P (Y ∈ B)
for all B. 1) follows from the definition and 3). 2) follows from the fact that if (X1, Y1) is independent of (X2, Y2),
then f(x1, x2, y1, y2) = f(x1, y1)f(x2, y2).
Recall that the data processing inequality also holds by Lemma 1. Hence, the general formula of maximal
leakage retains the axiomatic properties we required in (R3). It also covers all combinations of discrete, countable,
or continuous random variables X and Y .
Corollary 4: If X and Y are jointly continuous real random variables,
L (X→Y ) = log
∫
R
sup
x:fX(x)>0
fY |X(y|x)dy, (29)
where fX and fY |X(·|·) are the marginal pdf of X and the conditional pdf of Y given X , respectively.
Example 9: If X and Y are jointly Gaussian, then
L (X→Y ) =
{
0, if X and Y are independent,
+∞, otherwise.
Example 10: Suppose X is real and its pdf satisfies fX(x) > 0 for all x ∈ R. Let Y = X + Z, where Z is a
continuous real random variable independent of X . Let z0 = argmax fZ(z). Then
L (X→Y ) = log
∫
R
sup
x∈R
fY |X(y|x)dy = log
∫
R
sup
x
fZ(y − x)dy = log
∫
R
fZ(z0)dy = +∞.
The above examples suggest that “adding independent noise” is not necessarily secure in the maximal leakage
sense. The following example considers a simple model of the SSH side-channel and further illustrates this point.
Example 11: Consider the SSH side-channel and suppose we wish to perturb the packet timings before they are
sent over the network so that we decrease information leakage. We represent the process of incoming packets as
a Poisson process of a given rate, λ. More formally, fix T ∈ R+ and let ΩT be the set of all counting functions
on [0, T ], i.e., ω ∈ ΩT is an integer-valued, nondecreasing, right-continuous function on [0, T ] and ω(0) = 0. Let
{Ft}Tt=0 be the filtration over ΩT generated by the mapping ω 7→ ωt. Let XT0 be a Poisson process of rate λ,
representing the incoming packets. Let Y T0 be a point process on (ΩT ,FT ) representing the outgoing packets.
a) Memoryless scheme: Suppose we hold each packet for an independent random amount of time before
releasing it into the network. More specifically, let Y T0 be the output of an initially-empty exponential-server queue
with rate µ > λ and input XT0 . Then
1
T
L (XT0→Y T0 ) = µ, (30)
and, as T →∞, the average waiting time for a packet (between arrival and transmission) tends to 1µ−λ . Note that
the system is unstable if µ < λ.
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Proof: Let P0 be the probability measure on (ΩT ,FT ) under which the output is distributed as a Poisson
process of rate one. It is known [52] [53, Ch. VI, Theorem T3] that for (x, y) ∈ ΩT × ΩT ,
dPXY
dPX × P0 (x, y) = exp
[∫ T
0
log(µI(xt > yt−))dyt +
∫ T
0
(1− µI(xt > yt))dt
]
=: L(x, y).
Now note that,
dPXY
dPX × PY dPY =
dPXY
dPX × PY
dPX × P0
dPX × P0
dPY
dP0
dP0 = LdP0,
where the equalities follow from [54, Ex. 32.6, p. 426] and the fact that dPX×P0dPX×PY =
dP0
dPY
. Then
L (XT0→Y T0 ) = log ∫
ΩT
ess-supPXL(X, y)P0(dy).
It is easy to verify that ess-supPXL(X, y) = exp(yT logµ+ T ). By noting that yT is distributed as Poi(T ) under
P0, we get
1
T
L (XT0→Y T0 ) = 1T log
∫
ΩT
exp [yT logµ+ T ]P0(dy) =
1
T
log exp[T (µ− 1) + T ] = µ.
The computation of the average waiting time is standard (e.g., [55, (3.26)]).
b) Accumulate-and-dump: Fix τ ∈ R+ and m ∈ N. Assume (for simplicity) that τ divides T , and consider
the following scheme. The packets are accumulated, then released (“dumped”) only at integer multiples of τ . If in
a given interval more than m packets are received, only the first m are sent and the remaining ones are dropped.
Then
1
T
L (XT0→Y T0 ) = 1τ log(m+ 1), (31)
and the average waiting time for a packet is τ/2 assuming it is not dropped. Moreover,
Pe ≤ eλτ(ν−(1+ν) log(1+ν)), (32)
where Pe is the probability that the number of packets exceeds m in a given interval of length τ , and ν =
(m+ 1)/(λτ)− 1. Hence, choosing m to be (1 + νˆ)λτ − 1, for some νˆ > 0, yields
1
T
L (XT0→Y T0 ) = 1τ log((1 + νˆ)λτ),
and a probability of dropping a packet that is exponentially small in νˆ. Note that, as opposed to the memoryless
scheme above, accumulate-and-dump can make the leakage arbitrarily small. For a more direct comparison, suppose
we wish the average waiting time to be no more than 1/λ. Hence, for the memoryless scheme we choose µ = 2λ,
which leads to a leakage of 2λ. For the accumulate-and-dump scheme, choose τ = 2/λ and νˆ = e3/2 − 1(≈ 9).
Then one can readily verify that the leakage is 3λ/2 and Pe is on the order of 10−12.
Proof: Since the number of arrivals in a Poisson process are identically distributed and independent for non-
overlapping intervals of the same length,
1
T
L (XT0→Y T0 ) = 1T Tτ L (Xτ0→Y τ0 ) = 1τ L (Xτ0→Yτ ) = 1τ log(m+ 1),
where the last equality follows from the fact that Yτ is a deterministic function of Xτ0 that takes values in
{0, 1, . . . ,m}. To compute the average waiting time, it is enough to consider the waiting time for the packets that
arrive in the first interval [0, τ ]. Conditioned on Xτ = N , the arrival times are distributed as the ordered statistics of
N independent uniform random variables over [0, τ ] [56, Ch. 4, Theorem 4A]. Therefore, the conditional average
waiting time is τ/2. Hence, the average waiting time is τ/2. Finally, the upper bound on Pe is an application of
the Chernoff bound to Poisson random variables.
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c) Inject dummy packets: Song et al. [1] suggest using dummy packets to keep the rate of transmission fixed.
That is, they use accumulate-and-dump with an extra parameter mb ∈ N. If in a given interval N < mb packets
are received, we inject mb −N dummy packets. Then
1
T
L (XT0→Y T0 ) = 1τ log(m−mb + 1). (33)
Remark 6: In [1], the authors do not suggest an upper bound on the number of packets that can be released in
a given interval. They implicitly assume that there exists an m for which the number of arrivals in a given interval
is at most m almost surely. This is not true for the Poisson process, but for any process that satisfies this property,
the leakage of accumulate-and-dump + inject-dummy-packets is upper-bounded by the right hand side of (33).
The choice of m and mb provides a trade-off between the overhead of injecting dummy packets and the probability
of dropping a packet. Song et al. [1] also point out an important drawback of the memoryless scheme. If the
adversary observes several independent instances of the output for the same input (e.g., they eavesdrop several
times on the same user while they are inputting their password), they can diminish the effect of randomization by
considering the average (over the different observations) of the inter-arrival times between successive packets.
Similar observations hold for the optimal mechanism for the Shannon cipher system, to which we turn next.
IV. SHANNON CIPHER SYSTEM
The main goal in quantifying information leakage is to enable the design of mechanisms to mitigate it. As an
application, we study a (traditional) secrecy setup known as the Shannon cipher system [3]. The setup consists
of a transmitter and a legitimate receiver that are linked by a public noiseless channel and share a common
key, and an eavesdropper who has access to the public channel and is aware of the source statistics and the
used encryption schemes. The encryption schemes must allow the legitimate receiver to perfectly reconstruct the
source sequence. Shannon [3] showed that perfect secrecy (i.e., making the source Xn and the public message M
independent) requires a key rate as high as the message rate, which is typically not feasible in practice. Hence
several works [3,23]–[25,29,57] studied the optimal partial secrecy achievable for a given key rate r, and used
different measures to assess secrecy guarantees.
Fig. 3. The Shannon cipher system with lossy communication: the transmitter and the legitimate receiver have access to a common key
K, which consists of nr purely random bits, where r is called the key rate. Using both the public message M and the secret key K, the
legitimate receiver generates a reconstruction Y n that should satisfy a given distortion constraint. The eavesdropper has access to the public
message M only.
In this section, we use maximal leakage to assess the performance of any feasible encryption scheme. Similarly to
previous works, we are concerned with the dependence between the source and the public message (i.e., L (Xn→M)
in our case, as opposed to the dependence between the secret key and the public message). Moreover, we allow for
lossy communication by introducing a distortion function d at the legitimate receiver, as shown in Figure 3. For a
given distortion level D, we require that the probability of violating the distortion constraint decays as 2−nα, for
a given α > 0. Then, for a given D and α, we study the asymptotic behavior of the normalized maximal leakage.
For a discrete memoryless source (DMS), we derive the optimal (i.e., minimal) limit of the normalized maximal
leakage. The scheme we propose for the primary user (i.e., the transmitter–legitimate receiver pair) operates on a
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type-by-type basis. With each type, we associate a good rate-distortion code. The codebooks are then divided into
bins, and the key is used to randomize, within a bin, the choice of codeword associated with a particular source
sequence. However, types with low enough probability are discarded, i.e., a dummy message is associated with all
the source sequences belonging to such types.
We also derive the optimal limit when the requirement of a decaying probability of violating the distortion
constraint is replaced with an expected distortion constraint. In this scenario, one might expect that memoryless
schemes are sufficient for optimality. We evaluate this claim by considering the case in which there is no common
key and the rate of the channel is high (cf. Figure 4). This setup was dubbed the “information blurring system”
Fig. 4. Information blurring system.
in [25], and it represents a stylized model of side-channels. For instance, in the SSH setup, Xn could represent
the timings of the incoming packets, Y n could represent the perturbed timings of the outgoing packets, and the
distortion function could represent required quality (e.g., delay) constraints imposed on the system. We show that,
even in this setup, memoryless schemes are strictly suboptimal in general. This strengthens our earlier observations
in Section III-F and suggests that commonly used memoryless schemes are generally outperformed by quantization-
based schemes.
A. Problem Setup and Statement of Result
Let X and Y be the alphabets associated with the transmitter and the legitimate receiver, respectively. The
transmitter and the legitimate receiver are connected through a noiseless channel of rate R, and share common
randomness Kn ∈ Kn = {0, 1}nr, where Kn is uniformly distributed over Kn, and r > 0 is the rate of the
key. The transmitter observes an n-length message Xn = (X1, X2, · · · , Xn), independent of Kn, and wishes to
communicate it to the receiver. Let f and h be, respectively, the transmitter’s encoding and the receiver’s decoding
functions. The transmitter then sends a message Mn = f(Xn,Kn), Mn ∈ Mn = {0, 1}nR, and the receiver
generates a reconstruction Y n = h(Mn,Kn). We allow the functions f and h to be randomized (beyond the private
randomness in Kn). For a given distortion function d : X × Y → R+, distortion level D, and excess distortion
probability α, we require that Pr(d(Xn, Y n) > D) ≤ 2−nα, where d(Xn, Y n) = 1n
∑n
i=1 d(Xi, Yi).
An eavesdropper intercepts the message M . We assume they know the source statistics as well as the encoding
and decoding functions, but do not have access to the key Kn.
The primary user aims to minimize the maximal leakage to the eavesdropper L (Xn→Mn). We characterize the
asymptotically-optimal normalized maximal leakage under the following assumptions1:
(A1) The alphabets X and Y are finite.
(A2) The source is memoryless and has full support.
(A3) The distortion function d is bounded, i.e., there exists Dmax such that, for all x ∈ X and y ∈ Y , d(x, y) ≤
Dmax. Moreover, D ≥ Dmin, where Dmin = maxx∈X miny∈Y d(x, y).
(A4) R > maxQ:D(Q||P )≤αR(Q,D), where R(Q,D) is the rate-distortion function for source distribution Q.
We denote the optimal limit by L(P,D,
−→
R,α), where P is the source distribution, and
−→
R = (R, r):
L(P,D,
−→
R,α) = lim
n→∞ min{fn∈Fn}
1
n
L (Xn→f(Xn,Kn)) ,
1Note that it is necessary to have R ≥ maxQ:D(Q||P )≤αR(Q,D) for the primary user’s problem to be feasible.
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where {Fn} is the set of feasible schemes, i.e., Fn = {fn : X n×{0, 1}nr → {0, 1}nR
∣∣ there exists g : {0, 1}nR×
{0, 1}nr → Yn satisfying Pr
(
d
(
Xn, g
(
f (Xn,Kn) ,Kn
))) ≤ 2−nα}.
It will be more notationally convenient in this section to give the answers in bits rather than nats. Hence we will
use the logarithm to the base 2 when computing maximal leakage. To avoid confusion, we will explicitly mention
the unit we are using.
The main result of this section is the characterization of the optimal limit as follows:
Theorem 8: Under assumptions (A1)-(A4), for any DMS P and distortion function d with associated distortion
level D ≥ Dmin and distortion excess probability α > 0:
L(P,D,
−→
R,α) = max
Q:D(Q||P )≤α
[R(Q,D)− r]+ (bits), (34)
where [a]+ = max{0, a}.
Note that the case α =∞ (i.e., when the distortion constraint is imposed almost surely) is included in the theorem.
Moreover, in that case, the theorem holds even if the source is not memoryless, as long as the support of Xn
is X n. This follows from the fact that L (Xn→Mn) and the constraint, when imposed almost surely, depend on
the distribution of Xn only through its support. Therefore, solving for any specific distribution on that support is
equivalent to solving for all distributions on the same support.
Before proving the theorem (in Sections IV-D and IV-E for achievability and converse, respectively), we discuss
a variation using an expected distortion constraint and its implication on the performance of memoryless schemes.
B. Memoryless Schemes with Expected Distortion
Instead of requiring a decaying probability of violating the distortion constraint, we could require that the
distortion constraint holds only in expectation—as is common in many works in the literature. In that case, we
modify assumption (A4) to be:
(A4’) R > R(P,D).
Theorem 9: Under assumptions (A1)-(A3) and (A4’), for any DMS P and distortion function d with associated
distortion level D ≥ Dmin:
L(P,D,
−→
R ) = [R(P,D)− r]+ (bits). (35)
Proof: The achievability argument follows by a similar manner as the one given in subsection IV-D. However,
instead of encoding on a type-by-type basis, we simply use a good rate-distortion code that satisfies the expected
distortion requirement and divide it into bins of size 2nr. One could also derive it from Theorem 8 as follows:
L(P,D,
−→
R ) ≤ lim
D′→D+
lim
α→0
L(P,D′,
−→
R,α) = [R(P,D)− r]+.
As for the lower bound, we use the fact that I∞(X;Y ) ≥ I(X;Y ) [28]. This problem, with mutual information
replacing maximal leakage, has already been solved by Schieler and Cuff [23]. More specifically, Corollary 5 of [23]
yields that the optimal normalized mutual information is indeed given by [R(P,D)− r]+.
With the expected distortion constraint, one might venture that the optimal limit is achievable with a memoryless
scheme, in which the encoder passes the source through i.i.d copies of an optimal conditional distribution PY |X .
Counter to this common intuition, and counter to the case in which leakage is measured via mutual information,
we show that this is generally not the case when the objective is maximal leakage.
To that end, consider the case in which r = 0 and R = log |Y| (cf. Figure 4). By Theorem 9, L(P,D) = R(P,D).
Now define
Lmemn (P,D) = min
PY |X :E[d(X,Y )]≤D
1
n
L (Xn→Y n) , (36)
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where PXnY n =
∏n
i=1 PXiPYi|Xi . By the additive property of maximal leakage, it follows straightforwardly that
Lmemn (P,D) does not depend on n, so we will drop the n subscript.
Lemma 8: Lmem(P,D) = R(P,D) if and only if there exists PY |X that achieves the rate-distortion function
and satisfies 1) PXY (x, y)PXY (x′, y) > 0 ⇒ PY |X(y|x) = PY |X(y|x′), and 2)
∑
x:PXY (x,y)>0
PX(x) =∑
x′:PXY (x′,y′)>0 PX(x
′) for all y, y′ ∈ supp(Y ).
Proof: The proof follows straightforwardly from Lemma 2.
The above conditions imply that for some conditional achieving the rate-distortion function P ?Y |X , L
mem(P,D) =
L (X→Y ) = I(X;Y ) = R(P,D). If X has full support, then L (X→Y ) = I(X;Y ) ⇒ L (X→Y ) = C(P ?Y |X).
Hence, R(P,D) = C(P ?Y |X). The latter equality is not a sufficient condition, however. Hence, memoryless schemes
are strictly suboptimal, except in very special cases.
We next strengthen this observation by relaxing the constraint in (36) by allowing the choice of the conditional
distribution PYi|Xi to depend on the index i. So define
Lmem,in (P,D) = min
PY n|Xn :PY n|Xn=
∏n
i=1 P
(i)
Yi|Xi
1
n
L (Xn→Y n) (37)
subject to E[d(Xn, Y n)] ≤ D.
This is still not sufficient to achieve optimality in general, as the following lemma shows.
Lemma 9: Suppose Xn is i.i.d ∼ Ber(p), p ∈ (0, 1/2], d is the Hamming distortion, and D ∈ [0, p]. Then
Lmem,in (P,D) ≥ (1−D/p) (bits).
On the other hand, by Theorem 9, L(P,D) = R(P,D) = H(p) − H(D). Since H(p) − H(D) < 1 − D/p in
general (where the inequality can be checked using convexity), memoryless schemes are strictly suboptimal.
Proof: For any PY n|Xn in the minimization, let Di = E[d(Xi, Yi)] = Pr(Xi 6= Yi). Without loss of generality,
we can assume Di ≤ p. Then
L (Xn→Y n) =
n∑
i=1
L (Xi→Yi) ≥
n∑
i=1
min
PYi|Xi :
Pr(Xi 6=Yi)≤Di
L (Xi→Yi) .
We show in Appendix C that
min
PYi|Xi :
Pr(Xi 6=Yi)≤Di
L (Xi→Yi) = log2(2−Di/p) (bits). (38)
Thus,
L (Xn→Y n) ≥
n∑
i=1
log2(2−Di/p)
=
n∑
i=1
log2
(
2− (Di/p)(1)− (1−Di/p)(0)
)
(a)
≥
n∑
i=1
(Di/p) log2(1) + (1−Di/p) log2(2)
=
n∑
i=1
(1−Di/p)
(b)
≥ n(1−D/p),
where (a) follows from the fact that log2(2− x) is concave in x, and (b) follows from the constraint in (37).
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C. Notation
In the following, Z is an arbitrary discrete set, and Z is a random variable over Z .
- For a sequence zn ∈ Zn, Qzn is the empirical PMF of zn, also referred to as its type.
- QnZ is the set of types in Zn, i.e., the set of rational PMF’s with denominator n.
- For QZ ∈ QnZ , the type class of QZ is TQZ , {zn ∈ Zn : Qzn = QZ}.
- EQ[·], HQ(·), and IQ(·; ·) denote respectively expectation, entropy, and mutual information taken with respect
to distribution Q.
- exp2{.} denotes 2(·).
D. Achievability Proof of Theorem 8
We will slightly abuse notation and shorten L(P,D,
−→
R,α) to L in the following. We now show that the right-hand
side of (34) upper-bounds L.
Consider any  > 0 and let n be large enough such that we can construct a rate-distortion code CnQX , for each
type QX ∈ QnX , satisfying the following: each sequence xn ∈ TQX is covered and |CnQX | ≤ 2n(R(QX ,D)+). Such
construction is guaranteed by the type covering lemma (Lemma 9.1 in [26]). We divide the codebook CnQX into⌈∣∣∣CnQX ∣∣∣ /2nr⌉ bins, each of size 2nr, except for possibly the last one. We denote by CnQX (i, ·) the ith partition of
the codebook, and by CnQX (i, j) the jth codeword in the ith partition. For each xn ∈ TQX , let ixn and jxn denote,
respectively, the index of the partition containing the codeword associated with xn and the index of the codeword
within the partition (Note that if more than one codeword can be associated with xn, we fix any one of them
arbitrarily). Finally, let m(QX , i, j) be a message consisting of the following:
• dlog2 |QnX |e bits to describe the type QX .
•
⌈
log2
⌈∣∣∣CnQX ∣∣∣ /2nr⌉⌉ bits to describe the index i, where 1 ≤ i ≤ ⌈∣∣∣CnQX ∣∣∣ /2nr⌉.
•
⌈
log2
∣∣∣CnQX (i, ·)∣∣∣⌉ bits to describe the index j, where 0 ≤ j ≤ exp2 ⌈log2 ∣∣∣CnQX (i, ·)∣∣∣⌉− 1.
Now, for any δ ∈ R, let Q(α, δ) = {QX : D(QX ||P ) ≤ α+ δ}, Qn(α, δ) = {QX ∈ QnX : D(QX ||P ) ≤ α+ δ},
and consider the following lemma.
Lemma 10:
lim
δ→0
max
QX∈Q(α,δ)
R(QX , D) = max
QX∈Q(α,0)
R(QX , D).
Proof: This follows directly from the convexity of D(Q||P ), and Propositions 12 and 13 in [25].
Now let δ > 0 be such that maxQX∈Q(α,δ)R(QX , D) < R (Such δ exists by Lemma 10 and (A4)). Finally, for
each sequence xn, let s(xn) =
⌈
log
∣∣∣CnQX (ixn , ·)∣∣∣⌉, and let Ks(xn) be the first s(xn) bits of Kn. The transmitter
encodes as follows. Given xn, if Qxn ∈ Qn(α, δ), then
f(xn,Kn) = m
(
Qxn , ixn , jxn ⊕Ks(xn)
)
, (39)
where the XOR-operation is performed bitwise. Note that, in this case, the legitimate receiver can retrieve the type
of the transmitted sequence and the index of the bin from the first two parts of the message, and the index of the
sequence within the bin using the last part of the message and the key Kn, so that h(Mn,Kn) = CnQxn (ixn , jxn).
Now, consider an m0 ∈Mn that has not been used by the previous encoding (Assumption (A4) and the choice of
δ ensures the existence of such m0). Then, for all xn such that Qxn /∈ Qn(α, δ),
f(xn,Kn) = m0. (40)
Remark 7: To verify that the suggested scheme satisfies the excess distortion probability constraint, consider the
following:
Pr(d(Xn, Y n) > D) ≤
∑
QX /∈Qn(α,δ)
P (Q) ≤
∑
QX /∈Qn(α,δ)
2−nD(QX ||P ) ≤ (n+ 1)|X |2−n(α+δ) < 2−nα,
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where the last inequality holds for large enough n.
Effectively, we are leaking the first two parts of the message QXn and iXn , and hiding completely the last part
jXn . Since there are only polynomially many types, the first part does not affect the normalized leakage. The second
part, however, consists roughly of R(Q,D)− r bits, whenever R(Q,D) > r; otherwise, i.e., when R(Q,D) ≤ r,
there is only one bin and there is no information to be leaked.
For a more rigorous analysis, let Pf be the induced joint probability distribution of (Xn,Mn). Then, for xn
satisfying Qxn ∈ Qn(α, δ), we get from (39):
Pf
(
m(Qxn , ixn , j)
∣∣xn) = 2−s(xn), 0 ≤ j ≤ 2s(xn) − 1.
Let S(xn) = 2s(x
n). Note that we can equivalently denote S(xn) by S(Qxn , ixn), since the dependence on the
sequence is only through the type and the index of the bin. Therefore, we get
exp2{L (Xn→Mn)} =
∑
m∈Mn
max
xn∈Xn
Pf (m|xn)
= max
xn∈Xn
Pf (m0|xn) +
∑
QX∈
Qn(α,δ)
d|CnQX |/2nre∑
i=1
S(QX ,i)−1∑
j=0
max
xn∈Xn
Pf (m(QX , i, j)|xn)
= 1 +
∑
QX∈
Qn(α,δ)
d|CnQX |/2nre∑
i=1
S(QX ,i)−1∑
j=0
S(QX , i)
−1
≤ 1 +
∑
QX∈Qn(α,δ)
(2n(R(QX ,D)+−r) + 1)
≤ 1 + 2
∑
QX∈Qn(α,δ)
2nmax{R(QX ,D)+−r,0}
≤ 4(n+ 1)|X | exp2{n max
QX∈Qn(α,δ)
[R(QX , D) + − r]+}. (41)
Taking the limit as n tends to infinity, and noting that  and δ were arbitrary, we get that
L ≤ max
Q:D(Q||P )≤α
[R(Q,D)− r]+,
where the inequality follows from Lemma 10 and the following lemma, the simple of proof of which is omitted.
Lemma 11:
lim
n→∞ maxQ∈QnX :D(Q||P )≤α
R(Q,D) = max
Q:D(Q||P )≤α
R(Q,D).
E. Converse Proof of Theorem 8
We now show that L is lower-bounded by the right-hand side of (34). To that end, consider any valid encoding
function f . To lower-bound L (Xn→Mn), we consider a specific PU |Xn . In particular, we consider the “shattering”
PU |Xn given in (13). Recall
PU |Xn((iu, ju)|xn) =

p?
P (xn) , iu = x
n, 1 ≤ ju ≤ bk(xn)c,
1− (dk(xn)e−1)p?P (xn) , iu = xn, ju = dk(xn)e,
0, iu 6= xn, 1 ≤ ju ≤ dk(iu)e.
Therefore, maxu∈U PU (u) = p?. We will also consider a sub-optimal guessing function for U . The scheme is
as follows: the eavesdropper first tries to guess the key Kn by choosing an element uniformly at random from
{0, 1}nr. We denote this guess by K˜n. Then, proceeding by assuming that the key guess was correct, they try to
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guess the sequence xn using a guessing function given by Lemma 12 below. We denote this stage by g1. Finally,
again proceeding by assuming that the source sequence guess was correct, the eavesdropper attempts to guess U
by using the MAP rule. We denote this stage by g2, and we get for each xn ∈ X n,
g2(x
n) = (xn, 1), and Pr(g2(xn) = Un|xn) = p?/P (xn). (42)
Lemma 12: There exists a function g1 : Yn → X n such that, for all (xn, yn) satisfying d(xn, yn) ≤ D,
Pr (xn = g(yn)) ≥ cn2−n(HQxn (X)−R(Qxn ,D)), where cn = (n+ 1)−|X ||Y|(|X |+1).
Proof: This is an application of Lemma 5 in [25]. In particular, we set in Lemma 5 V to be X , de to be the
Hamming distortion function, and De to be zero. Then, IP ?n(Qxnyn )(X;V |Y ) (as defined in [25]) satisfies:
IP ?n(Qxnyn )(X;V |Y ) = HQxnyn (X|Y ) = HQxn (X)−HQxn (X) +HQxnyn (X|Y )
≤ HQxn (X)−R(Qxn , D).
To analyze the above scheme, fix  > 0, and let Pf denote the induced joint probability on (Xn,Kn,Mn).
Furthermore, without loss of generality, we can assume that the decoding function h is a deterministic function of
Mn and Kn. Finally, define
MD(xn, k) = {m ∈Mn : d(xn, h(m, k)) ≤ D}, xn ∈ X n, k ∈ Kn, (43)
and A = {(xn, yn) ∈ X n × Yn : d(xn, yn) > D}. (44)
Letting g be the concatenation of the two stages, we get
Pr(U = g(M))
=
∑
xn∈Xn
∑
u∈U
∑
k∈Kn
∑
m∈Mn
P (xn)PU |Xn(u|xn)PKn(k)Pf (m|xn, k)P (u = g(m)|xn,m, k)
≥
∑
xn∈Xn
∑
u∈U
∑
k∈Kn
∑
m∈MD(xn,k)
P (xn)PU |Xn(u|xn)PKn(k)Pf (m|xn, k)P (u = g(m)|xn,m, k)
≥
∑
xn∈Xn
∑
u∈U
∑
k∈Kn
∑
m∈MD(xn,k)
P (xn)PU |Xn(u|xn)PKn(k)Pf (m|xn, k)P (K˜n = k).
P (g1(h(m, k)) = x
n)P (g2(x
n) = u|xn)
(a)
≥ cn
∑
xn∈Xn
∑
k∈Kn
∑
m∈MD(xn,k)
P (xn)PKn(k)Pf (m|xn, k)2−nr2−n(HQxn (X)−R(Qxn ,D))p?/P (xn)
= cnp
?2−nr
∑
QX∈QnX
∑
xn∈TQX
∑
k∈Kn
∑
m∈MD(xn,k)
P (xn)PKn(k)Pf (m|xn, k)2−n(HQX (X)−R(QX ,D))/P (xn)
= cnp
?2−nr
∑
QX∈QnX
∑
xn∈TQX
∑
k∈Kn
∑
m∈MD(xn,k)
P (xn)PKn(k)Pf (m|xn, k)2n(R(QX ,D)+D(QX ||P ))
= cnp
?2−nr
∑
QX∈QnX
2n(R(QX ,D)+D(QX ||P ))Pf (Ac ∩ TQX ), (45)
where (a) follows from Lemma 12, (42), and (43). Now, note that for any Q,
Pf (Ac|TQ) = 1− Pf (A|TQ) ≥ 1−min{1, Pf (A)/P (TQ)}
≥ 1−min{1, 2−n(α−D(Q||P )− |X|n log(n+1))}
= max{0, 1− 2−n(α−D(Q||P )− |X|n log(n+1))}.
27
Then, continuing (45), we get
Pr(U = g(M)) ≥ cnp?2−nr
∑
QX∈QnX
2n(R(QX ,D)+D(QX ||P ))P (TQX ) max{0, 1− 2−n(α−D(QX ||P )−
|X|
n
log(n+1))}
(a)
≥ c′np?2−nr
∑
QX∈Qn(α,−)
2nR(QX ,D)(1− 2−n(α−D(QX ||P )− |X|n log(n+1)))
(b)
≥ c′np?2−nr
∑
QX∈Qn(α,−)
2nR(QX ,D)(1/2)
≥ (c′np?/2) max
QX∈Qn(α,−)
exp2{n(R(QX , D)− r)}, (46)
where (a) and (b) hold for large enough n, and c′n = (n+ 1)−|X |cn. Finally taking the ratio of Pr(U = g(M))
and maxu PU (u), and taking the limit as n tends to infinity, and noting that  is arbitrary, we get
L ≥ max
Q:D(Q||P )≤α
R(Q,D)− r,
where the inequality follows from Lemmas 10 and 11. Since L is positive by definition,
L ≥ [ max
Q:D(Q||P )≤α
R(Q,D)− r]+ = max
Q:D(Q||P )≤α
[R(Q,D)− r]+.
V. LEARNING MAXIMAL LEAKAGE FROM DATA
In the previous two sections, we analyzed leakage-mitigating schemes for a simple model of the SSH side-channel
and derived the (asymptotically) optimal scheme for the Shannon cipher system. In general, computing the maximal
leakage induced by a given scheme might become intractable for complicated schemes. Consider, for instance, an
on-chip network with several processes sharing its memory. Suppose one of the processes is malicious and another
process is decrypting a message using a secret key. As we mentioned in the introduction, a side-channel exists
between these two processes because the memory access patterns of the latter affect the memory access delays
of the former. This side-channel, however, is determined by the operation of the memory controller which could
depend on many variables, as well as the behavior of other processes on the chip which might be difficult to model.
For such complicated schemes, one might simulate the system and attempt to estimate maximal leakage from
data traces. This section investigates the complexity of this task, i.e., the number of samples needed to estimate
L (X→Y ), which we equivalently denote by L(PX ;PY |X). To this end, an estimator is defined as a randomized
function f : (X × Y)? → R, which maps a sequence of samples drawn from a joint distribution to an estimate of
its maximal leakage. Given a desired level of accuracy δ and a probability of error , the sample complexity of an
estimator f is defined as:
Sδ,
(|X |, |Y|)[f ] = min{n : PXY (∣∣L(PX ;PY |X)− f(Xn, Y n)∣∣ > δ) < , for all PXY ∈ PX×Y}, (47)
where PXY ∈ PX×Y is the set of all probability distributions on X × Y , and (Xn, Y n) are drawn independently
from PXY . Then the sample complexity of maximal leakage is defined as:
Sδ,
(|X |, |Y|) = inf
f
Sδ,
(|X |, |Y|, θ)[f ]. (48)
We show that Sδ,(|X |, |Y|) turns out to be infinity for interesting values of the parameters. Hence, the design
of secure systems should take amenability to analysis into consideration. That is, it is preferable to design, for
instance, a memory controller that we can study analytically, rather than one that follows complicated ad-hoc rules
that are (only) believed to be secure.
28
The impossibility result is mainly due to the discontinuity of maximal leakage in the support of X . More precisely,
let θ be a lower bound on the minimum strictly positive probability of an element in X , and define
PθX×Y = {PXY ∈ PX×Y : min
x∈X :PX(x)>0
PX(x) ≥ θ}, (49)
Sδ,
(|X |, |Y|, θ) =inf
f
min{n : PXY
(∣∣L(PX ;PY |X)−f(Xn, Y n)∣∣> δ)< , for all PXY ∈PθX×Y}. (50)
Then the following lower bound holds.
Theorem 10: For  = 0.1 and c0 < 1/2 there exists c such that for all θ, all |X |, all sufficiently large |Y|, and
all 1/|Y| < δ < c0, we have
Sδ,(|X |, |Y|, θ) ≥ c θ|Y|
log |Y| log
2 1
δ
. (51)
If θ → 0, the bound diverges to infinity, which justifies our earlier claim that Sδ,(|X |, |Y|) is +∞. Nevertheless,
if a lower bound θ is known, then the following upper bound holds.
Theorem 11: For all θ ∈ (0, 1), finite alphabets X and Y , δ > 0, and  ∈ (0, 1),
Sδ,
(|X |, |Y|, θ) ≤ 8( log(5/) + |Y| log |X |)
θ
(
(2− e−δ) log(2− e−δ) + e−δ − 1) . (52)
For small δ, the denominator behaves as δ2. If θ is of the order of 1/|X |, we get S(θ, δ, ) ≤
O
(|X |(|Y| log |X |+ log(1/))/δ2).
Remark 8: In terms of the dependence on the alphabets and θ, the upper and lower bounds are within sub-
polynomial factors of each other.
We prove the achievability result in Section V-B and the converse result in Section V-C. Both proofs use
the standard technique of Poisson sampling, so we now clarify the connection between Poisson and fixed-length
sampling.
A. Poisson Sampling
With Poisson sampling, for a given n, we first generate N ∼ Poi(n) and then generate (XN , Y N ) from PXY .
So we define the Poisson sample complexity as follows:
S˜δ,
(|X |, |Y|, θ) = inf
f
min{n : N ∼ Poi(n),Pr (∣∣L(PX ;PY |X)− f(XN , Y N )∣∣ > δ) < , for all PXY ∈ PθX×Y}.
(53)
The following lemma will be useful for our analysis. It is a simple application of the Chernoff bound, hence its
proof is omitted.
Lemma 13: Consider δ ∈ (0, 1), λ > 0, and let N ∼ Poi(λ).
Pr(N ≥ (1 + δ)λ) ≤ exp{λ(δ − (1 + δ) log(1 + δ))}, (54)
and
Pr(N ≤ (1− δ)λ) ≤ exp{λ(−δ − (1− δ) log(1− δ))}. (55)
Remark 9: It is a simple exercise to check that the exponents are negative for all δ ∈ (0, 1).
We now show that fixed-length sampling and Poisson sampling are equivalent, up to constant factors.
Lemma 14: Fix  ∈ (0, 1), δ > 0, and θ ∈ (0, 1). Suppose there exists f such that, given n1 ≥ log(5/)/ log(4/e)
and N ∼ Poi(n1),
Pr
(∣∣L(PX ;PY |X)− f(XN , Y N )∣∣ > δ) < 45 .
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Then
Sδ,
(|X |, |Y|, θ) ≤ 2n1. (56)
On the other hand, if there exists n2 ≥ log(1/)/ log(e/2) such that, for all estimators f ,
Pr
(∣∣L(PX ;PY |X)− f(XN , Y N )∣∣ > δ) > 2,
where N ∼ Poi(n2), then
Sδ,
(|X |, |Y|, θ) ≥ n2
2
. (57)
Proof: Consider an optimal fixed-length estimator with 2n1 samples. Then, a Poi(n1) estimator can outperform
it only if N > 2n1. However, by Lemma 13,
Pr(Poi(n1) > 2n1) ≤ e−n1(2 log 2−1) ≤ /5.
Conversely, consider an optimal fixed-length estimator n2/2 samples. Then, it can outperform a Poi(n2) estimator
only if N < n2/2. However, by Lemma 13,
Pr(Poi(n2) < n2/2) ≤ e−n2(1+log(1/2)) ≤ .
B. Proof of Theorem 11
Let
M(PX ;PY |X) := exp{L(PX ;PY |X)} =
∑
y∈Y
max
x∈X :
PX(x)>0
PY |X(y|x). (58)
It is straightforward to verify that a (1− e−δ)-multiplicative estimator for M(PX ;PY |X) translates to a δ-additive
estimator for L(PX ;PY |X), where a δˆ-multiplicative estimator means that |M − Mˆ | ≤ δˆM . Therefore, in the
remainder, we will analyze multiplicative estimators of M . Now, consider n ∈ N and let N ∼ Poi(n). Let
(X1, Y1), (X2, Y2), . . . , (XN , YN ) be N independent samples drawn from a distribution PXY . For each x ∈ X and
y ∈ Y , let Nx denote the number of times x appears, Ny the number of times y appears, and Nx,y the number of
times (x, y) appears in the sequence. Then, Nx ∼ Poi(nPX(x)), Ny ∼ Poi(nPY (y)), and Nx,y ∼ Poi(nPXY (x, y)).
Now, let θ′ = θ/4. The estimator works as follows:
1) For each x ∈ X with Nx > 0, generate a random variable N˜x ∼ Poi(nθ′). If Nx = 0, set N˜x = 0.
2) For each x ∈ X with Nx > 0, keep only the first N˜x samples containing x and disregard the rest.
a) If there are not enough samples for some x (i.e., N˜x > Nx), then let Mˆ = 1.
b) Otherwise, let
Mˆ =
∑
y∈Y
max
x∈X
N˜x,y
nθ′
, (59)
where N˜x,y is the number of times (x, y) appears in the truncated sequence.
To analyze the above estimator, we first consider a slightly modified setting. In particular, suppose the estimator
has access to an infinite sequence (X1, Y1), (X2, Y2), . . . Then, Nx = +∞ with probability 1 for each x ∈
supp(X). In this case, for each (x, y) with PX(x) > 0, N˜x,y ∼ Poi(nθ′PY |X(y|x)). For each y ∈ Y , let x(y) ∈
argmaxx:PX(x)>0 PY |X(y|x). Let δˆ = 1− e−δ, and consider the following:
Pr
(
Mˆ −M ≤ −δˆM
)
= Pr
∑
y∈Y
max
x∈X
N˜x,y/nθ
′ ≤ (1− δˆ)M

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= Pr
∑
y∈Y
max
x∈X
N˜x,y ≤ (1− δˆ)Mnθ′

≤ Pr
∑
y∈Y
N˜x(y),y ≤ (1− δˆ)Mnθ′

(a)
= Pr
(
Poi
(
nθ′M
) ≤ (1− δˆ)Mnθ′)
(b)
≤ exp
{
Mnθ′
(
−δˆ − (1− δˆ) log(1− δˆ)
)}
(c)
≤ exp
{
nθ′
(
−δˆ − (1− δˆ) log(1− δˆ)
)}
, (60)
where (a) follows from the fact that N˜x,y’s are independent Poi
(
nθ′PY |X(y|x(y))
)
, (b) follows from Lemma 13,
and (c) follows from the fact that M ≥ 1. Now consider the probability that Mˆ exceeds M by a factor of at least
δˆM :
Pr
(
Mˆ −M ≥ δˆM
)
= Pr
∑
y∈Y
max
x∈X
N˜x,y ≥ (1 + δˆ)Mnθ′

= Pr
 ⋃
(x1,...,x|Y|)∈X |Y|
∑
y∈Y
N˜xy,y ≥ (1 + δˆ)Mnθ′

= Pr
 ⋃
(x1,...,x|Y|)∈X |Y|
Poi
nθ′∑
y∈Y
PY |X(y|xy)
 ≥ (1 + δˆ)Mnθ′

(a)
≤ |X ||Y|Pr
(
Poi(nθ′M) ≥ (1 + δˆ)Mnθ′
)
(b)
≤ |X ||Y| exp
{
Mnθ′
(
δˆ − (1 + δˆ) log(1 + δˆ)
)}
(c)
≤ |X ||Y| exp
{
nθ′
(
δˆ − (1 + δˆ) log(1 + δˆ)
)}
, (61)
where (a) follows from Lemma 15 below and the fact that for any (x1, . . . , x|Y|) ∈ X |Y|,
∑
y∈Y PY |X(y|xy) ≤M ,
(b) follows from Lemma 13, and (c) follows from the fact that M ≥ 1.
Lemma 15: Consider λ1 > 0, λ2 > 0 such that λ1 ≥ λ2, and let N1 ∼ Poi(λ1), and N2 ∼ Poi(λ2). Then, for
all k,
Pr(N1 ≥ k) ≥ Pr(N2 ≥ k).
The proof follows from a simple coupling argument and is omitted. Now let
n? =
log(5/) + |Y| log |X |
θ′
(
(1 + δˆ) log(1 + δˆ)− δˆ
) . (62)
For such a choice, we get by (60) and (61),
Pr
(
|Mˆ −M | ≥ δˆM
)
≤ 2/5. (63)
Remark 10: For all δˆ ∈ (0, 1), δˆ + (1− δˆ) log(1− δˆ) ≥ (1 + δˆ) log(1 + δˆ)− δˆ.
Note that the Poisson estimator behaves identically to the infinite-sequence estimator unless there exists x ∈
supp(X) for which Nx = 0 or N˜x > Nx. Therefore, we need to compute the probability of that event.
Pr
(
there exists x ∈ supp(X) : N˜x > Nx
)
≤
∑
x∈supp(X)
Pr(N˜x > Nx)
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≤
∑
x∈supp(X)
Pr
(
Poi(n?θ′) ≥ Poi (n?PX(x))
)
(a)
≤
∑
x∈supp(X)
exp
{
−
(√
n?PX(x)−
√
n?θ′
)2}
(b)
≤
∑
x∈supp(X)
exp
{
−
(√
4n?θ′ −
√
n?θ′
)2}
≤ |X |e−n?θ′
(c)
≤ /5, (64)
where (a) follows from the Chernoff bound, (b) follows from the fact that for all x ∈ supp(X), PX(x) ≥ θ = 4θ′,
and (c) follows from the fact that (1 + δˆ) log(1 + δˆ)− δˆ < 2 log 2− 1 < 1 for δˆ ∈ (0, 1). Similarly,
Pr (there exists x ∈ supp(X) : Nx = 0) ≤
∑
x∈supp(X)
Pr(Nx = 0) =
∑
x∈supp(X)
e−n
?PX(x) ≤ |X |e−n?θ′
≤ /5. (65)
It follows from equations (63), (64), (65), and Lemma 14 that
Sδ,(|X |, |Y|, θ) ≤ 2 log(5/) + |Y| log |X |
θ′
(
(1 + δˆ) log(1 + δˆ)− δˆ
) .
Remark 11: One can readily verify that n? ≥ log(5/)/ log(4/).
Plugging in δˆ = 1− e−δ and θ′ = θ/4 yields Theorem 11.
Remark 12: The proof shows that the risk of overestimating leakage is what controls the sample complexity of
the estimator. If one is merely interested in ensuring that the estimator does not underestimate the true leakage,
which is often the case in practice, then from (60) and (64) the sample complexity is
8
(
log(5/) + log |X |)
θ
(
(2− e−δ) log(2− e−δ) + e−δ − 1) .
C. Proof of Theorem 10
Let |Y| = k. We will derive a lower-bound on complexity by considering a subproblem, i.e., we will restrict our
attention to a subset of PθX×Y (cf. (49)). In particular, consider PXY ∈ PθX×Y that satisfy PX(x1) = θ ∈ (0, 1) and
PY |X that have the following form:
PY |X =

p1 p2 · · · pk
1/k 1/k · · · 1/k
...
...
...
1/k 1/k · · · 1/k
 , (66)
where pY = (p1, p2, · · · , pk) is some distribution over Y . Now, for any distribution pY over Y , define
h(pY ) = log
∑
y∈Y
max
{
1
k
, py
} . (67)
Therefore,
L(PX ;PY |X) = h(PY |X(·|x1)). (68)
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Hence, estimating maximal leakage for this subproblem is the same as estimating a property of PY |X(·|x1). Let
S˜hδ,(|Y|) = inf
f
min{n : N ∼ Poi(n),Pr (∣∣h(PY )− f(Y N )∣∣ > δ) < , for all PY ∈ PY}, (69)
where PY is the set of all probability distributions on Y , and Y n is drawn independently according to PY . Since
sampling Poi(n) from PXY gives Poi(nθ) samples from PY |X(·|x1), we get
S˜δ,(|X |, |Y|, θ)) ≥ S˜hδ,(|Y|)/θ. (70)
It remains to show that
S˜hδ,(k) ≥ c ·
k
log k
log2
1
δ
. (71)
We shall show this by relating the problem of estimating h(pY ) to the problem of estimating the support size of
pY . Consider any distribution pY with the property that
pY (y) ≥ 1/k for all y such that pY (y) > 0. (72)
Then we have
eh(pY ) =
∑
y∈Y
max
{
1
k
, pY (y)
}
=
∑
y:pY (y)=0
1
k
+
∑
y:pY (y)≥1/k
pY (y)
=
k − |supp(pY )|
k
+ 1
= 2− |supp(pY )|
k
. (73)
Choose α such that
αδ ≤ log
(
1 +
δ
10
)
for all 0 < δ < 1/2 and let f(·) be an estimator such that
Pr(|h(pY )− f(Y N )| > αδ) < 
where N¯ is Poisson with mean θn and Y N is i.i.d. PY . Then we have
Pr
(
|h(pY )− f(Y N )| > log(1 + δ
10
)
< 
which, since
log
(
1 +
δ
10
)
= min
[
log
(
1 +
δ
10
)
,− log
(
1− δ
10
)]
implies that
Pr
(
|1− eh(pY )−f(Y N )| > δ
10
)
< . (74)
Since h(·) ≤ 2, we may assume that f(·) ≤ 2, in which case the previous inequality implies
Pr(|1− eh(pY )−f(Y N )| > δe−f(Y N )) < , (75)
which, by defining
f˜(Y N ) =
(
2− ef(Y N )
)
k,
substituting (73), and rearranging, gives
Pr
(∣∣∣|supp(pY )| − f˜(Y N )∣∣∣ > δk) < . (76)
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Thus f˜(·) estimates the support of pY with accuracy δk with probability at least  for all pY satisfying (72). It
then follows from, e.g., Wu and Yang [58, Theorem 2] (where the role of  and δ are reversed) that there exists a
constant c such that for all k and all δ such that 1k < δ < c0
θn ≥ c k
log k
log2
1

.
VI. GUESSING FRAMEWORK TO INTERPRET LEAKAGE METRICS
Finally, we use the guessing framework to provide operational definitions for commonly used information leakage
metrics. The new operational definitions clarify in which cases each metric should be used.
In particular, we show that Shannon capacity is suitable for covert channel analysis rather than side-channel
analysis. Local differential privacy emerges when the system designer is extremely risk averse (i.e., the probability
that U is revealed should be small for every possible realization y, regardless of the probability of the latter event).
The analysis will naturally lead us to define an information metric that is intermediate between maximal leakage
and local differential privacy, which we call maximal realizable leakage (cf. Section VI-B).
On the other hand, maximal correlation captures the multiplicative decrease, upon observing Y , of the variance of
functions of X . Hence it is more suitable for estimation problems, rather than guessing problems. This also naturally
leads to a cost-based notion of leakage, which considers reductions in costs and is investigated in Section VI-E.
A. Shannon Capacity
Shannon justifies the choice of mutual information by arguing that “From the point of view of the cryptanalyst [i.e.,
the adversary], a secrecy system is almost identical with a noisy communication system” [3]. This argument is not
persuasive, however, because a noisy communication system (the rate of which is governed by mutual information)
relies on coding, of which there is generally none in the side-channel setting. One could argue that Shannon is
simply taking a “pessimistic” view by upper-bounding leakage by assuming that the transmitter is a cooperative
participant and thus willing to code. This reasoning is erroneous, however; Shannon capacity is generally lower
than maximal leakage. The reason is that Shanon capacity is concerned with (the size of) message sets that can be
reliably reconstructed at the receiver, whereas leakage does not impose any reliability constraint. This inspires the
following definition.
Definition 7 (Recoverable Leakage): Given  > 0 and a joint distribution PXY on finite alphabets X and Y , the
recoverable leakage from X to Y is defined as
LC (X→Y ) = sup
(U,X):U−X−Y
Pr(U=Uˆ(Y ))≥1−
log
Pr(U = Uˆ(Y ))
maxu PU (u)
, (77)
where the support of U is finite but of arbitrary size, and Uˆ(Y ) is the MAP estimator.
Remark 13: LC (X→Y ) depends on PXY only through PY |X .
Theorem 12: For any joint distribution PXY on finite alphabets X and Y ,
lim
→0
lim
n→∞
1
n
LC (Xn→Y n) = C(PY |X), (78)
where (Xn, Y n) is distributed i.i.d according to PXY , and C(PY |X) is the capacity of the channel PY |X .
Shannon capacity is a suitable metric for covert channel analysis, in which there are two adversaries attempting to
(covertly) communicate through PY |X . That is, they are indeed concerned with sending and reconstructing messages
reliably. To compare with maximal leakage, suppose X has full support. Then,
L (X→Y ) (a)= lim
→0
lim
n→∞
1
n
L (Xn→Y n)
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(b)
= lim
→0
lim
n→∞
1
n
sup
(U,Xn):
U−Xn−Y n
log
Pr(U = Uˆ(Y n))
maxu PU (u)
≥ lim
→0
lim
n→∞
1
n
sup
(U,Xn):
U−Xn−Y n
Pr(U=Uˆ(Y n))≥1−
log
Pr(U = Uˆ(Y n))
maxu PU (u)
= C(PY |X),
where (a) follows from the additivity of maximal leakage, and (b) follows from the fact that L (X→Y ) depends
on PX only through its support. One can readily verify that the inequality can be strict.
Example 12: Consider X ∼ Ber(p), p ∈ (0, 1/2). If Y is the output of a BEC() ( ∈ (0, 1)) with input X ,
then L (X→Y ) = log(2− ) > (1− ) log 2 = C(PY |X).
Proof: To show that the left-hand side upper-bounds the right-hand side, consider
LC (Xn→Y n) = sup
(U,Xn):U−Xn−Y n
Pr(U=Uˆ(Y n))≥1−
log
Pr(U = Uˆ(Y ))
maxu PU (u)
≥ sup
(U,Xn):U−Xn−Y n
Pr(U=Uˆ(Y n))≥1−
U∼uniform
log |U|+log(1− ). (79)
Note that the right-hand side of the above equation is exactly the channel coding setup: U is the uniform message,
PXn|U is the (stochastic) encoding map, PY |X is the memoryless channel, and  is the allowed average probability
of decoding error. Therefore, for any δ > 0, any U with |U| < 2n(C−δ) is feasible for large enough n, yielding the
lower bound. For the reverse direction, consider the following.
LC (Xn→Y n) = sup
(U,Xn):U−Xn−Y n
Pr(U=Uˆ(Y n))≥1−
log
Pr(U = Uˆ(Y ))
maxu PU (u)
≤ sup
(U,Xn):U−Xn−Y n
Pr(U=Uˆ(Y n))≥1−
log
1
2−H∞(PU )
= sup
(U,Xn):U−Xn−Y n
Pr(U=Uˆ(Y n))≥1−
H∞(PU )
(a)
≤ sup
(U,Xn):U−Xn−Y n
Pr(U=Uˆ(Y n))≥1−
I(U ; Uˆ) + 1
Pr(U = Uˆ)
≤ sup
(U,Xn):U−Xn−Y n
Pr(U=Uˆ(Y n))≥1−
nC(PY |X) + 1
1−  ,
where (a) follows from [59, Theorem 5]. Taking the limit as n→∞ and → 0 yields the upper bound.
B. Maximal Realizable Leakage
We now consider a variation of the definition of maximal leakage, which captures a different scenario of interest.
It will be also useful for interpreting local differential privacy in the guessing framework (cf. Section VI-C). In
particular, maximal leakage considers the average guessing performance of the adversary, Pr(U = Uˆ(Y )), for
each U satisfying U −X − Y since our threat model “tolerates” realizations y of Y that lead to a high probability
of correct guessing if the corresponding probabilities PY (y)’s are very small. For scenarios in which such small
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probability events are still unacceptable, we need to consider the maximum instead of the average performance.
This is the case, for example, when U represents an individual’s medical data or when we do not expect leakage
to be concentrated around Y (e.g., Y is a public database as opposed to a running stochastic process). This leads
to the following definition.
Definition 8 (Maximal Realizable Leakage): Given a joint distribution PXY on finite alphabets X and Y , the
maximal realizable leakage from X to Y is defined as
Lr (X→Y ) = sup
U :U−X−Y
log
maxy∈supp(Y ) maxu∈U PU |Y (u|y)
maxu∈U PU (u)
, (80)
where the support U is finite but of arbitrary size.
Theorem 13: For any joint distribution PXY on finite alphabets X and Y , the maximal realizable leakage from
X to Y is given by the Renyi Divergence of order infinity, D∞(PXY ||PX × PY ). That is,
Lr (X→Y ) = max
(x,y)∈X×Y
PXY (x,y)>0
log
PY |X(y|x)
PY (y)
= D∞(PXY ||PX × PY ). (81)
In contrast, L (X→Y ) = I∞(X;Y ) = infQY D∞(PXY ||PX ×QY ). Consequently, Lr (X→Y ) depends on PX (as
opposed to L (X→Y ) which only depends on the support) and is symmetric in X and Y . Note that it is equal
to the maximum information rate, which is the random variable the expectation of which is mutual information.
It follows straightforwardly from the definitions that Lr (X→Y ) ≥ L (X→Y ). Moreover, Lr (X→Y ) cannot be
bounded in terms of |X | and |Y|: consider the BEC example (Example 12) where X ∼ Ber(p) (p ∈ (0, 1/2)) and
Y is the output of a BEC() ( ∈ (0, 1)) with input X , then Lr (X→Y ) = log(1/p) p→0−−−→∞.
Furthermore, Lr (X→Y ) exhibits desirable properties of a leakage metric: it satisfies the data processing
inequality, it is zero if and only X and Y are independent, and it is additive over independent pairs {(Xi, Yi)}.
These properties are known for Renyi divergence of order ∞ [60].
Remark 14: The fact that using the max in (80) and the average in (1) both lead to quantities with
desirable properties suggests that we could also consider weighted averages, i.e., replace the numerator by(∑
y PY (y) maxu P
α
U |Y (u|y)
)1/α
, for some α > 0. See also [61].
Proof: That Lr (X→Y ) ≤ D∞(PXY ||PX×PY ) follows directly from Proposition 5. For the reverse direction,
we again consider the shattering PU |X (cf. equation (13)). It is a simple exercise to check that this choice yields
the desired lower bound.
C. Local Differential Privacy
Differential privacy [62] is a widely adopted metric in the database security literature. Roughly speaking, it
requires that, for any two neighboring databases, the probabilities of any given output do not differ significantly.
Local differential privacy [31] adapts that notion to the setting of a given conditional distribution PY |X . It is defined
as:
Ldp(X→Y ) = max
y∈Y,
x,x′∈X
log
PY |X(y|x)
PY |X(y|x′)
. (82)
Local differential privacy is known to be pessimistic [31]. It is indeed very strict: for the BEC example (Example 12)
where X ∼ Ber(p) (p ∈ (0, 1/2)) and Y is the output of a BEC() ( ∈ (0, 1)) with input X , Ldp(X→Y ) = ∞.
Interestingly, we also noted in the previous section that limp→0 Lr (X→Y ) =∞.
So what operational problem is local differential privacy solving? Similarly to maximal realizable leakage, local
differential privacy is concerned with worst-case analysis over the realizations of Y . Moreover, being a function
of PY |X , it is robust against the worst-case distribution PX . Hence, differential privacy is suitable for database
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security problems in which we do not tolerate low risk, and we do not make any assumptions about the distribution
generating the data. This yields the following definition.
Definition 9: Given a conditional distribution PY |X from X to Y , where X and Y are finite alphabets, let
Ldp(X→Y ) = sup
PX
sup
U :U−X−Y
log
maxymaxuPU |Y (u|y)
maxu PU (u)
= sup
PX
Lr (X→Y ) . (83)
Theorem 14: For any conditional distribution PY |X from X to Y , where X and Y are finite alphabets,
Ldp(X→Y ) = Ldp(X→Y ). (84)
Clearly, Ldp(X→Y ) ≥ Lr (X→Y ) ≥ L (X→Y ). Theorems 13 and 14 imply that Ldp(X→Y ) = Lr(X→Y ) if
and only if X and Y are independent. Thus, Ldp(X→Y ) = L (X→Y ) if and only if X and Y are independent.
Moreover, an interesting implication of (83) is that one could incorporate information about the marginal PX by
restricting the optimization set of the sup.
Proof: By Theorem 13, we can rewrite (83) as
Ldp(X→Y ) = sup
PX
max
(x,y)∈X×Y
PXY (x,y)>0
log
PY |X(y|x)
PY (y)
.
The upper bound thus follows from the fact that PY (y) ≥ minx PY |X(y|x). For the lower bound, consider the follow-
ing. Let y? be an element achieving the max in (82). Let x0 ∈ argminx PY |X(y?|x) and x1 ∈ argmaxx PY |X(y?|x).
Finally, for a given α > 0, let PX(x0) = 1− α and PX(x1) = α. Then
Ldp(X→Y ) ≥ log maxx PY |X(y
?|x)
PY (y?)
= log
PY |X(y?|x1)
(1− α)PY |X(y?|x0) + αPY |X(y?|x1)
α→0−−−→ log PY |X(y
?|x1)
PY |X(y?|x0)
= Ldp(X→Y ).
It is worth noting that Dwork et al. [50] provide an operational definition closely related to the above definition.
In particular, a simple modification of their result yields that
Ldp(X→Y ) = sup
PX
sup
f :X→{0,1}
y∈Y
∣∣∣∣log(Pr(f(X) = 1|Y = y)Pr(f(X) = 1)
)∣∣∣∣ .
Alternatively, Kairouz et al. [51] give an operational definition of (, δ)-differential privacy in the framework of
hypothesis testing. They show that it determines the trade-off between the probabilities of false alarm and missed
detection.
D. Maximal Correlation
Given a joint distribution PXY , the Hirschfeld-Gebelein-Rényi maximal correlation [46,63,64] ρm(X;Y ) is
defined as
ρm(X;Y ) = sup
f,g:
E[f ]=E[g]=0
E[f2]=E[g2]=1
E[f(X)g(Y )]. (85)
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Calmon et al. showed that, when the alphabet X is finite,
sup
N,f :X→[N ]
(
sup
fˆ(·)
Pr(f(X) = fˆ(Y ))− max
k∈[N ]
Pf (k)
)
≤ ρm(X;Y ),
where the supremum is over deterministic functions [34, Theorem 9]. However, as we saw in the introduction, the
left-hand side can be zero even when X and Y are dependent. We posit that maximal correlation is more precisely
capturing the change in variance. That is, we define variance leakage as follows.
Definition 10 (Variance Leakage): Given a joint distribution PXY on alphabets X and Y , the variance leakage
from X to Y is defined as
Lv(X→Y ) = sup
U :U−X−Y
var(U)>0
log
var(U)
E[(U −E[U |Y ])2] . (86)
Lemma 16: For any joint distribution PXY on alphabets X and Y , the variance leakage from X to Y is given
by
Lv(X→Y ) = − log(1− ρ2m(X;Y )), (87)
where ρm(X;Y ) is the maximal correlation.
As such, maximal correlation is capturing the multiplicative decrease in variance. If the U of interest is discrete,
which is often the case in practice (e.g., U is a password, a social security number, etc.), the probability of correct
guessing is arguably the more relevant quantity. This holds true even in the case of location privacy, in which (as
we saw earlier) typical functions of interest, such as work/home addresses or political affiliations, are discrete.
Proof: The proof is a simple rewriting of Rényi’s equivalent characterization, taking into account randomized
functions of X . We include it here for completeness. Without loss of generality, we can restrict the optimization
in (86) to U ’s that satisfy E[U ] = 0, and E[U2] = 1. So, we rewrite
Lv(X→Y ) = sup
U :U−X−Y
E[U ]=0, E[U2]=1
log
1
E[U2]−E[E[U |Y ]2]
= sup
U :U−X−Y
E[U ]=0, E[U2]=1
− log (1−E [E[U |Y ]2]). (88)
Also, we can rewrite maximal correlation using Renyi’s equivalent characterization [46]:
ρm(X;Y ) = sup
f :E[f(X)]=0
E[f2(X)]=1
√
E [E[f(X)|Y ]2]. (89)
Now note that
ρ2m(X;Y ) = sup
f : E[f ]=0, E[f2]=1
E
[
E[f(X)|Y ]2]
(a)
≤ sup
U :U−X−Y
E[U ]=0, E[U2]=1
E
[
E[U |Y ]2]
≤ sup
U :U−X−Y
E[U ]=0, E[U2]=1
sup
h: E[h(U)]=0,
E[h2(U)]=1
E
[
E[h(U)|Y ]2]
= sup
U :U−X−Y
E[U ]=0, E[U2]=1
ρ2m(U ;Y )
(b)
≤ ρ2m(X;Y ), (90)
38
where (b) follows from the fact that maximal correlation obeys the data processing inequality, which can be shown
using standard properties of conditional expectation. Therefore (a) is in fact an equality. Plugging it in (88) yields
our desired result.
Definition 10, with the restriction that U = X , has also been recently investigated by Asoodeh et al. [65]. Note
that it can be rewritten as
Lv(X→Y ) = sup
U :U−X−Y
var(U)>0
log
infuE[(U − u)2]
infu(·)E[(U − u(Y ))2]
. (91)
Hence, Lv(X→Y ) measures the reduction in cost incurred by the adversary, where cost is measured by the mean
squared error. In the next section, we consider a natural extension in which we do not assume the cost function is
known a priori.
E. Maximal Cost Leakage
In this section, we introduce a leakage metric that is dual to maximal leakage. Whereas maximal leakage considers
the maximum gain that the adversary achieves, we could alternatively consider the maximum reduction in cost they
incur.
Definition 11 (Maximal Cost Leakage): Given a joint distribution PXY on alphabets X and Y , the maximal cost
leakage from X to Y is defined as
Lc (X→Y ) = sup
U :U−X−Y
Uˆ , d:Uˆ×U→R+
log
inf uˆ∈Uˆ E[d(U, uˆ)]
inf uˆ(·)E[d(U, uˆ(Y ))]
, (92)
where U takes value in a finite (but arbitrary) alphabet, and 00 = 1 by convention.
It is important to note that the gain-based approach is more operationally meaningful (for side-channel analysis)
than the cost-based approach. To illustrate this, suppose d is the Hamming distortion and consider
sup
U :U−X−Y
log
1−maxu∈U PU (u)
1− supuˆ(·)Pr(U = uˆ(Y ))
. (93)
Recall that, in the definition of maximal leakage, we considered the ratio of the guessing probabilities (as opposed
to the difference) because we are typically interested in functions that are hard to guess (e.g., passwords). However,
the quantity in (93) is much more sensitive to changes for functions that are easy to guess: suppose for some
U , maxu PU (u) = 1 − 10−9 and supuˆ(·)Pr(U = uˆ(Y )) = 1, then the ratio in (93) is ∞. On the other hand, if
maxu PU (u) = 10
−9 and supuˆ(·)Pr(U = uˆ(Y )) = 10−3, the ratio is only ≈ 1.001 despite the significant change.
More generally, it is more intuitive to associate a gain to the adversary if they compromise the system, rather
than a cost if they fail to do so2 (an adversary does not “lose” if the system is not compromised). Even in the
rate-distortion-based approach to information leakage, the more robust metric is the probability that the adversary
incurs a small distortion [25] rather than (say) the expected value of the distortion. That is, the probability-metric
falls under the gain approach (similar to maximal locational leakage (cf. Definition 3) or maximal gain leakage
(cf. Definition 5)), albeit the gain is defined indirectly through a distortion function.
Nevertheless, maximal cost leakage admits a simple form for discrete X and Y , given in the following theorem.
Theorem 15: For any joint distribution PXY on finite alphabets X and Y , the maximal cost leakage from X to
Y is given by
Lc (X→Y ) = − log
∑
y∈Y
min
x∈X :
PX(x)>0
PY |X(y|x). (94)
2The cost and gain approaches may be equivalent if we are interested in the difference between the incurred cost (or achieved gain) when
Y is observed versus when no observations are made. This is not the case, however, if we are considering the ratio instead of the difference.
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It is worth noting that Lc (X→Y ), similarly to maximal leakage, depends on PXY only through PY |X and the
support of PX . Moreover, a relation analogous to (2) holds for Lc (X→Y ):
Lc (X→Y ) = inf
QY
D∞(PX ×QY ||PXY ). (95)
The proofs for Theorem 15 and the above relation are given in Appendices D-A and D-B, respectively. The following
corollary, the proof of which is given in Appendix D-C, summarizes useful properties of Lc (X→Y ).
Corollary 5: For any joint distribution PXY on finite alphabets X and Y ,
1) (Data Processing Inequality) If the Markov chain X − Y − Z holds for a discrete random variable Z, then
Lc (X→Z) ≤ min{Lc (X→Y ) ,Lc (Y→Z)}.
2) Lc (X→Y ) = 0 iff X and Y are independent.
3) (Additivity) If {(Xi, Yi)}`i=1 are mutually independent, then
Lc
(
X`1→Y `1
)
=
∑`
i=1
Lc (Xi→Yi) .
4) For any non-trivial deterministic law PY |X (i.e., |{y : PY (y) > 0}| > 1), Lc(X→Y ) = +∞.
5) Lc (X→Y ) is not symmetric in X and Y .
6) Lc (X→Y ) ≤ Ldp(X→Y ).
7) Lc (X→Y ) is convex in PY |X for fixed PX .
Thus maximal cost leakage satisfies axiomatic properties of a leakage measure. However, it cannot be bounded in
terms of |X | and |Y|. Indeed, even if X is a single bit, X ∼ Ber(p) for p ∈ (0, 1), Lc (X→X) = +∞. We evaluate
Lc (X→Y ) for some other examples.
Example 13: If X ∼ Ber(q), 0 < q < 1, and Y is the output of a BSC with input X and parameter p,
0 ≤ p ≤ 1/2, then Lc (X→Y ) = − log(2p).
Example 14: If X ∼ Ber(q), 0 < q < 1, and Y is the output of a BEC with input X and parameter , 0 ≤  < 1,
then Lc (X→Y ) = − log(), and Lc(Y→X) = +∞.
Remark 15: One can note that in each of the examples above, Lc (X→Y ) ≥ L (X→Y ). This is always true
when |X | = |Y| = 2, but it is not necessarily true in general. As a counter example, say X has full support and
PY |X =
0.2 0.5 0.30.3 0.4 0.3
0.2 0.4 0.4
. Then exp{L (X→Y )} = 1.2 and exp{Lc (X→Y )} = 1/0.9 = 1.1¯.
1) Comparison with Maximal Correlation: Definition 11 restricted U to be discrete, but the proof of the upper
bound in Theorem 15 does not need this assumption. That is, if we take the supremum over all real-valued U ’s,
the theorem still holds. Comparing with (91), we get Lc (X→Y ) ≥ Lv(X→Y ). We can rewrite this inequality as
follows.
Corollary 6: For any joint distribution PXY on finite alphabets X and Y ,
ρm(X;Y ) ≤
√
1− e−Lc(X→Y ). (96)
Consequently, for a fixed conditional distribution PY |X ,
sup
PX
s?(X;Y ) ≤ 1−
∑
y∈Y
min
x∈X
PY |X(y|x),
where s?(X;Y ) := supU :U−X−Y
I(U ;Y )
I(U ;X) is the strong data processing coefficient.
Note that inequality (96) is tight in the extremal cases, i.e., if X and Y are independent, if Y is a deter-
ministic function of X , or if X is a deterministic function of Y (it can be readily verified in this case that∑
y minx PY |X(y|x) = 0, unless X or Y is determinstic). The second inequality follows from the fact that
supPX s
?(X;Y ) = supPX ρ
2
m(X;Y ) [66, Theorem 8].
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2) Maximal Realizable Cost: Similarly to the modification of maximal leakage to maximal realizable leakage,
we could consider the minimum cost incurred at the adversary, instead of the average cost. We show next that this
yields the maximum of the negative of the information rate. Maximizing it over the input distribution also yields
local differential privacy.
Definition 12 (Maximal Realizable Cost): Given a joint distribution PXY on alphabets X and Y , the maximal
realizable cost from X to Y is defined as
Lrc(X→Y ) = sup
U :U−X−Y
Uˆ , d:Uˆ×U→R+
log
inf uˆ∈Uˆ E[d(U, uˆ)]
miny∈supp(Y ) inf uˆ∈Uˆ E[d(U, uˆ)|Y = y]
, (97)
where Uˆ is a finite alphabet, and 00 = 1 by convention.
Theorem 16: For any joint distribution PXY on finite alphabets X and Y , the maximal realizable cost from X
to Y is given by the Rényi divergence of order infinity, D∞(PX × PY ||PXY ). That is,
Lrc(X→Y ) = log max
x,y:
PX(x)PY (y)>0
PY (y)
PY |X(y|x)
= D∞(PX × PY ||PXY ). (98)
Similarly to maximal realizable leakage, Lrc(X→Y ) depends on PX not only through its support. They are also
analogous in that the former is equal to D∞(PXY ||PX × PY ) and the latter is equal to D∞(PX × PY ||PXY ).
Corollary 7: For any conditional distribution PY |X from X to Y , where X and Y are finite alphabets,
max
PX
Lrc(X→Y ) = Ldp(X→Y ). (99)
A consequence of Theorem 14 and Corollary 7 is that local differential privacy is concerned with both worst-case
reductions in costs incurred and worst-case increases in gains achieved at the adversary. The proofs of Theorem 16
and Corollary 7 are given in Appendices D-D and D-E, respectively.
VII. DISCUSSION
It is worth noting that Sibson’s mutual information of infinite order (2) has appeared in the data compression
literature as the Shtarkov sum [67], which evaluates the worst-case regret.More recently, it has also been used as
a complexity measure in the study of communication complexity [68].
If X is binary and not deterministic and Y = X , then the maximal leakage from X to Y is one bit. Thus if
X represents, say, whether Alice has a stigmatized disease, and Alice reveals this information to Bob, maximal
leakage would declare that only one bit has been leaked to him. Maximal leakage would likewise declare that one
bit has been leaked if Alice revealed the first bit of her phone number or whether she was born on an even- or
odd-numbered day. Thus maximal leakage fails to capture the gravity of revealing highly-confidential quantities
if those quantities can only take a few possible values. The reason is simply that maximal leakage measures the
extent to which randomized functions of X that are difficult to guess a priori become easy to guess after observing
Y . Any binary-valued function can be guessed a priori with probability at least 1/2. Therefore the increase in the
guessing probability upon observing Y cannot be large. According to maximal leakage, revealing whether Alice has
a particular disease is not a concern because Bob already has a reasonably high probability of guessing correctly
even without any information from Alice. Thus maximal leakage is an appropriate metric when the goal is to prevent
Bob from guessing quantities, such as passwords or keys, that are a priori hard to guess. Other metrics, such as
differential privacy (82) are more appropriate in the above scenario in which revealing a single bit represents a
significant breach.
Following the publication of an early version of this work, maximal leakage was used as a privacy metric in the
context of hypothesis testing [69], and in a more general setup of privacy-utility trade-offs [70]. Variations on the
definition of maximal leakage that yield Sibson mutual information of finite orders have also been considered [61].
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APPENDIX A
PROOFS FOR SECTION II
A. Proof of Lemma 1
1) Consider any discrete U satisfying U −X −Y and define G(U ;Y ) = supUˆ :U−Y−Uˆ log
Pr(U=Uˆ)
maxu∈U PU (u)
. Clearly
if U −X − Y − Z holds, then G(U ;Z) ≤ G(U ;Y ). So if X − Y − Z holds,
L (X→Z) = sup
U :U−X−Z
G(U ;Z) = sup
U :U−X−Y−Z
G(U ;Z) ≤ sup
U :U−X−Y−Z
G(U ;Y ) = L (X→Y ) ,
Similarly,
L (X→Z) = sup
U :U−X−Z
G(U ;Z) = sup
U :U−X−Y−Z
G(U ;Z) ≤ sup
U :U−Y−Z
G(U ;Z) = L (Y→Z) .
2) If Y is discrete, then for any discrete U
sup
Uˆ :U−X−Y−Uˆ
Pr
(
U = Uˆ
)
=
∑
y∈supp(Y )
max
u∈U
PUY (u, y) ≤
∑
y∈supp(Y )
max
u∈U
PU (u) = |supp(Y )|max
u∈U
PU (u).
Hence for any U satisfying U − X − Y , G(U ;Y ) ≤ log |supp(Y )| and subsequently L (X→Y ) ≤
log |supp(Y )|.
3) If X is discrete, then L (X→Y ) ≤ L (X→X) ≤ log |supp(X)|, where the first inequality follows from 1)
and the second from 2).
4) If X and Y are independent, then any U satisfying U −X − Y is independent from Y . Hence G(U ;Y ) = 0
for all U , which implies L (X→Y ) = 0. The non-negativity is obvious.
B. Proof of Corollary 1
1) If L (X→Y ) = 0, then ∑y∈Y maxx∈supp(X) PY |X(y|x) = 1. Hence, ∑y∈Y maxx∈supp(X) PY |X(y|x) =∑
y∈Y PY (y). Since maxx∈supp(X) PY |X(y|x) ≥ PY (y) for every y ∈ Y , it follows that
maxx∈supp(X) PY |X(y|x) = PY (y) for all y ∈ Y . Therefore, X and Y are independent. The reverse direction
follows from Lemma 1.
2) The additivity property is known for I∞(X;Y ) [27,28].
3) Since ∑
y∈Y
max
x∈X
PY |X(y|x) ≤
∑
y∈Y
∑
x∈X
PY |X(y|x) = |X |,
equality holds if and only if for all y ∈ Y , maxx∈X PY |X(y|x) =
∑
x∈X PY |X(y|x). This condition holds if
and only if for all y ∈ Y , there exists a unique xy such that PY |X(y|xy) > 0. Finally, the latter condition
holds if and only if for all y ∈ Y , there exists xy such that PX|Y (xy|y) = 1.
4) The equality is straightforward to verify.
5) The asymmetry is illustrated in Example 5.
6) Convexity in PY |X follows from the fact that for each y ∈ Y , maxx PY |X(y|x) is convex in PY |X .
7) Concavity in PX follows from the fact that for any λ ∈ (0, 1) and any two distributions P1 and P2 on X ,
supp(λP1 + (1− λ)P2) = supp(P1) ∪ supp(P2).
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C. Proof of Lemma 2
Consider the following chain of inequalities.
I(X;Y ) =
∑
x∈X ,y∈Y
PXY (x, y) log
PY |X(y|x)
PY (y)
=
∑
x∈X ,y∈Y:
PXY (x,y)>0
PXY (x, y) log
PY |X(y|x)
PY (y)
(a)
≤ log
∑
x∈X ,y∈Y:
PXY (x,y)>0
PXY (x, y)
PY |X(y|x)
PY (y)
= log
∑
x∈X ,y∈Y:
PXY (x,y)>0
PX|Y (x|y)PY |X(y|x)
(b)
≤ log
∑
x∈X ,y∈Y:
PXY (x,y)>0
PX|Y (x|y) max
x′∈X :PX(x′)>0
PY |X(y|x′) = log
∑
y∈Y:
PY (y)>0
max
x∈X :PX(x)>0
PY |X(y|x)
(c)
= log
∑
y∈Y
max
x∈X :PX(x)>0
PY |X(y|x) = L(X → Y ),
where (a) is Jensen’s inequality, and (c) follows from the fact that PY (y) = 0 implies that
maxx∈X :PX(x)>0 PY |X(y|x) = 0. Now, note that (b) is an equality if and only if condition 1) holds. Given
condition 1), it can be seen that condition 2) is necessary and sufficient for (a) to become equality (by expanding
PY (y) =
∑
x:PXY (x,y)>0
PX(x)PY |X(y|x)).
APPENDIX B
PROOFS FOR SECTION III
A. Proof of Theorem 4
To show L(k) (X→Y ) ≥ L (X→Y ), we consider an arbitrary PU |X and construct PV |X such that
L(k) (X→Y ) [V ] = L (X→Y ) [U ]. In particular, for a given PU |X and associated alphabet U , let
V =
⋃
u∈U
{(u, 1), (u, 2), . . . , (u, k)}, and PV |X(v|x) = PV |X((av, bv)|x) = PU |X(av|x)/k.
Then the probability of correctly guessing V with k guesses after observing Y is:
sup
X−Y−(Vˆi)ki=1
Pr(V = Vˆ1 ∨ · · · ∨ V = Vˆk) =
∑
y∈Y
max
v1,v2,...,vk
vi 6=vj ,i 6=j
k∑
i=1
∑
x∈X
PX(x)PV |X(vi|x)PY |X(y|x)
=
∑
y∈Y
k∑
i=1
max
vi 6=v1,...,vi−1
∑
x∈X
PX(x)PV |X(vi|x)PY |X(y|x)
(a)
=
∑
y∈Y
max
u
∑
x∈X
PX(x)PU |X(u|x)PY |X(y|x), (100)
where (a) follows by setting vi = (u?, i), where
u? = argmax
u∈U
∑
x∈X
PX(x)PU |X(u|x)PY |X(y|x).
Now note that (100) is simply the probability of guessing U correctly with a single guess after observing Y . A
similar argument shows that, with no Y observation, the probability of guessing V correctly with k guesses is
equal to the probability of guessing U correctly with a single guess, hence L(k) (X→Y ) [V ] = L (X→Y ) [U ],
which establishes L(k) (X→Y ) ≥ L (X→Y ).
It remains to show L (X→Y ) ≥ L(k) (X→Y ). For any PV |X , we construct PU |X such that L (X→Y ) [U ] =
L(k) (X→Y ) [V ]. So let PV |X be given, with associated alphabet V , and let ` , |V| ≥ k. Now, let
U = {S ⊂ V : |S| = k}, and PU |X(u|x) = c
∑
v∈u
PV |X(v|x),
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where c = 1/
(
`−1
k−1
)
. Then, observing Y , the probability of guessing U correctly with a single guess is
sup
X−Y−Uˆ
Pr(U = Uˆ) =
∑
y∈Y
max
u∈U
∑
x∈X
PX(x)PU |X(u|x)PY |X(y|x)
=
∑
y∈Y
max
u∈U
∑
x∈X
PX(x)
∑
v∈u
PV |X(v|x)PY |X(y|x)c
= c
∑
y∈Y
max
v1,v2,...,vk
vi 6=vj ,i 6=j
∑
x∈X
k∑
i=1
PX(x)PV |X(vi|x)PY |X(y|x),
which is the probability, normalized by c, of guessing V correctly with k guesses after observing Y . A similar
argument shows that, with no Y observation, the probability of guessing U correctly with a single guess is equal to
the probability, normalized by c, of guessing V correctly with k guesses, hence L (X→Y ) [V ] = L(k) (X→Y ) [U ],
which establishes L (X→Y ) ≥ L(k) (X→Y ).
B. Proof of Theorem 6
Assume, without loss of generality, that X and Z have full marginal support. To show that the left-hand side is
upper-bounded by the right-hand side, fix PU |XZ and consider the following.
Pr(U = Uˆ(Y,Z))
Pr(U = U˜(Z))
=
∑
z p(z)
∑
y p(y|z) maxu p(u|y, z)∑
z p(z) maxu p(u|z)
≤ max
z
∑
y p(y|z) maxu p(u|y, z)
maxu p(u|z) .
Then by noting that the ratio being maximized is exp{L(X→Y |Z = z)}, we get
sup
U :U−(X,Z)−Y
Pr(U = Uˆ(Y,Z))
Pr(U = U˜(Z))
≤ max
z
∑
y
max
x:PX|Z(x|z)>0
PY |XZ(y|x, z).
To get the reverse inequality, let n = 1/n for n ∈ N, z? ∈ argmax
∑
y maxx:PX|Z(x|z)>0 PY |XZ(y|x, z), and
p? = minx:p(x|z?)>0 p(x|z?). Construct PU |XZ as follows. If Z = z?, then PU |X,Z=z? is the “shattering” conditional
with respect to the distribution PX|Z=z? (cf. equation (13)). If Z 6= z?, then U ∼ Unif([n]), independent of X .
Using Proposition 4, we get
Pr(U = Uˆ(Y,Z))
Pr(U = U˜(Z))
=
∑
z 6=z? p(z)
∑
y p(y|z) maxu p(u|y, z) + p(z?)
∑
y p(y|z?) maxu p(u|y, z?)∑
z 6=z? p(z) maxu p(u|z) + p(z?) maxu p(u|z?)
=
∑
z 6=z? p(z)n + p(z
?)p?
∑
y maxx:PX|Z(x|z?)>0 PY |XZ(y|x, z?)∑
z 6=z? p(z)n + p(z?)p?
=
(1− p(z?))n + p(z?)p?
∑
y maxx:PX|Z(x|z?)>0 PY |XZ(y|x, z?)
(1− p(z?))n + p(z?)p?
Letting n→∞ (i.e., n → 0) yields our lower bound.
C. Proof of Corollary 2
1) The data processing inequality follows directly from the definition as in the unconditional case.
2) The upper bound follows from Theorem 6 and Lemma 1.
3-4) The independence and additivity properties follow straightforwardly from the theorem.
5) I(X;Y |Z) ≤ maxz∈supp(Z) I(X;Y |Z = z) ≤ maxz∈supp(Z) L (X→Y |Z = z) = L (X→Y |Z).
6) The asymmetry follows immediately from the unconditional case.
7) Let Z −X − Y be a Markov chain. Then
L (X→Y |Z) = log
(
max
z∈supp(Z)
∑
y
max
x:PX|Z(x|z)>0
PY |XZ(y|x, z)
)
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= log
(
max
z∈supp(Z)
∑
y
max
x:PX|Z(x|z)>0
PY |X(y|x)
)
≤ log
(∑
y
max
x:PX(x)>0
PY |X(y|x)
)
= L (X→Y ) ,
where the inequality follows from the fact that supp(X) ⊇ supp(X|Z = z) for any z ∈ supp(Z). Note that
the inequality becomes an equality if for some z ∈ supp(Z), supp(X) = supp(X|Z = z).
8)
L (X→(Y, Z))− L (X→Z) = log
∑
z,y maxx:PX(x)>0 PY Z|X(y, z|x)∑
z maxx:PX(x)>0 PZ|X(z|x)
≤ log max
z∈supp(Z)
∑
y maxx:PX(x)>0 PY Z|X(y, z|x)
maxx:PX(x)>0 PZ|X(z|x)
= log max
z∈supp(Z)
∑
y maxx:PX(x)>0 PZ|X(z|x)PY |XZ(y|x, z)
maxx:PX(x)>0 PZ|X(z|x)
(a)
= log max
z∈supp(Z)
∑
y maxx:PX|Z(x|z)>0 PZ|X(z|x)PY |XZ(y|x, z)
maxx:PX(x)>0 PZ|X(z|x)
= log max
z∈supp(Z)
∑
y
max
x:PX|Z(x|z)>0
PY |XZ(y|x, z)
PZ|X(z|x)
maxx′:PX(x′)>0 PZ|X(z|x′)
≤ log max
z∈supp(Z)
∑
y
max
x:PX|Z(x|z)>0
PY |XZ(y|x, z)
= L (X→Y |Z) ,
where (a) follows from the fact that PX|Z(x|z) = 0, PX(x) > 0 and PZ(z) > 0 implies that PZ|X(z|x) = 0,
so that the maximum is achieved outside this set.
D. Proof of Theorem 7
Proof of 1): To show that the right-hand side upper-bounds the left-hand side, fix any PU |X , and consider the
following
sup
Uˆ(Y )
Pr(U = Uˆ(Y )) =
∫
Y
max
u∈U
∫
X
PU |X(u|x)PXY (dxdy)
=
∫
Y
max
u∈U
∫
X
PU |X(u|x)f(x, y)PX(dx)PY (dy)
≤
∫
Y
max
u∈U
∫
X
PU |X(u|x)(ess-supPXf(X, y))PX(dx)PY (dy)
=
∫
Y
(ess-supPXf(X, y))
(
max
u∈U
∫
X
PU |X(u|x)PX(dx)
)
PY (dy)
= (max
u∈U
PU (u))
∫
Y
(ess-supPXf(X, y))PY (dy).
To show the reverse direction, we will show it first for discrete X , and then extend the result by discretizing
more general X’s. Suppose X has a finite alphabet. In this case, σ(X) is generated by a finite set, and
PXY  PX × PY since I(X;Y ) ≤ H(X) < ∞. Without loss of generality, suppose X has full support.
Consider the “shattering” PU |X . Recall: p? = minx∈X PX(x). For each x ∈ X , let k(x) = PX(x)/p?, and let
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U = ⋃x∈X {(x, 1), (x, 2), . . . , (x, dk(x)e)}. For each u = (iu, ju) ∈ U and x ∈ X , let PU |X(u|x) be:
PU |X((iu, ju)|x) =

p?
PX(x)
, iu = x, 1 ≤ ju ≤ bk(x)c,
1− (dk(x)e−1)p?PX(x) , iu = x, ju = dk(x)e,
0, iu 6= x, 1 ≤ ju ≤ dk(iu)e.
Then
sup
Uˆ(Y )
Pr(U = Uˆ(Y )) =
∫
Y
max
(iu,ju)∈U
∑
x∈X
PU |X((iu, ju)|x)f(x, y)PX(x)PY (dy)
=
∫
Y
max
(iu,1)∈U
p?f(iu, y)PY (dy)
= p?
∫
Y
max
x∈X
f(x, y)PY (dy).
The proof for the discrete case is completed by noticing that p? = maxu PU (u).
Now, consider the more general case. Let {An}∞n=1 be a countable collection of sets generating σ(X). We will
prove the result by considering a series of discretizations of X , each of which is a refinement of the previous one.
To that end, let Sn be the finite partition generating σ(∪ni=1Ai). It can be readily verified that Sn+1 is a refinement
of Sn. Let Nn = |Sn|, Sn = {Sn,1, Sn,2, · · · , Sn,Nn}, and define
Un(X) =
Nn∑
i=1
i I{X ∈ Sn,i},
where I{.} is the indicator function. Then we get L(X → Y ) ≥ L(Un → Y ) since Un−X−Y is a Markov chain,
and the data processing inequality holds by Lemma 1. By the earlier result for finite X , we have
L(Un → Y ) = log
∫
Y
sup
u:PUn (un)>0
fn(un, y)PY (dy),
where fn(un, y) =
dPUnY
d(PUn×PY ) . We next compute fn(un, y). Let A ⊆ Un × Y . Then
PUn,Y (A) =
∫
Y
∑
un
I{(un, y) ∈ A}
∫
X
PUn|X(un|x)f(x, y)PX(dx)PY (dy)
=
∫
Y
∑
un
I{(un, y) ∈ A}
(∫
Sn,un
f(x, y)PX(dx)
)
PY (dy)
=
∫
Y
∑
un:PUn (un)>0
I{(un, y) ∈ A}
(∫
Sn,un
f(x, y)PX(dx)∫
Sn,un
PX(dx)
)
PUn(un)PY (dy),
so that
fn(un, y) =
∫
Sn,un
f(x, y)PX(dx)∫
Sn,un
PX(dx)
.
Let Sn(x) be the set in Sn containing x. Then we can view fn(un, y) as a function of (x, y):
fn(x, y) =
∫
Sn(x)
f(x, y)PX(dx)∫
Sn(x)
PX(dx)
.
We can rewrite fn(x, y) = E[f(X, y)|X ∈ Sn(x)], so that
fn(X, y) = E[f(X, y)|σ(Sn)]. PX − a.s. (101)
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Since Sn’s are refinements, fn(X, y) is a martingale process, and it follows by Levy’s upward Theorem [71,
Theorem 14.2] that
fn(X, y)
a.s.→ E [f(X, y)|σ (∪∞i=1Si)] . (102)
Then
E [f(X, y)|σ (∪∞i=1Si)] = E [f(X, y)|σ (∪∞i=1Ai)] = E [f(X, y)|σ (X)] a.s.= f(X, y). (103)
Moreover,
L(X → Y ) ≥ lim sup
n→∞
L(Un → Y ) = lim sup
n→∞
log
∫
Y
sup
u:PUn (un)>0
fn(un, y)PY (dy) (104)
= lim sup
n→∞
log
∫
Y
sup
x:PX(Sn(x))>0
fn(x, y)PY (dy). (105)
Since Sn+1 is a refinement of Sn, the integrand is nondecreasing with n. Therefore, by the monotone convergence
theorem,
L(X → Y ) ≥ log
∫
Y
lim
n→∞ supx:PX(Sn(x))>0
fn(x, y)PY (dy). (106)
Then it remains to show that
lim
n→∞ supx:PX(Sn(x))>0
fn(x, y) ≥ ess-supPXf(X, y) (107)
for all y. To that end, let B = {α : PX(f(X, y) > α) > 0}. Consider r ∈ B and let Er = {x : f(x, y) > r}.
Then PX(Er) > 0. Therefore, by (102) and (103), fn(X, y) converges almost everywhere to f(X, y) on Er. By
Egoroff’s Theorem [72, Theorem 7.12], for every δ > 0, there exists E′δ such that PX(E
′
δ) < δ and fn converges
uniformly to f on Er\E′δ. Call the latter set Er\δ. So fix δ > 0 small such that PX(Er\δ) > 0. For each n, let
Sn(Er\δ) be a collection of sets in Sn satisfying: ∪S∈Sn(Er\δ) ⊇ Er\δ and S ∈ Sn(Er\δ) ⇒ S ∩ Er\δ 6= ∅. Then
there must exist S ∈ Sn(Er\δ) satisfying P (S) > 0. Denote the latter set by Sn(Er\δ). Hence,
lim
n→∞ supx:PX(Sn(x))>0
fn(x, y)
(a)
≥ lim
n→∞ supx∈Sn(Er\δ)
fn(x, y) (108)
(b)
≥ lim
n→∞ infx∈Er\δ
fn(x, y) (109)
(c)
= inf
x∈Er\δ
f(x, y) (110)
≥ r, (111)
where (a) follows from the fact that PX(Sn(Er\δ)) > 0, (b) follows from the fact that Sn(Er\δ) ∩ Er\δ 6= ∅, and
(c) follows from the fact that fn(x, y) converges uniformly to f on Er\δ. Finally, since r was chosen arbitrarily
from B, we get
lim
n→∞ supx:PX(Sn(x))>0
fn(x, y) ≥ supB = ess-supPXf(X, y), (112)
as desired.
Proof of 2): If absolute continuity does not hold, then I(X;Y ) = +∞, and there exists a sequence of
discretizations (Xn, Yn) such that I(Xn;Yn) → +∞ (e.g., [73, p. 37]). The result then follows by noting that
L (X→Y ) ≥ L (Xn→Yn) ≥ I(Xn;Yn).
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E. Proof of Lemma 7
Suppose PX1Y1  PX1 × PY1 and let dPX1Y1 = f1(x, y)d(PX1 × PY1). Then for every A ∈ σX and B ∈ σY ,∫
X
[∫
Y
1(y ∈ B)dµ(x, dy)
]
1(x ∈ A)dPX1(dx) =
∫
X
[∫
Y
1(y ∈ B)f1(x, y)dPY1(dy)
]
1(x ∈ A)dPX1(dx).
Since this holds true for all A we must have∫
Y
1(y ∈ B)dµ(x, dy) =
∫
Y
1(y ∈ B)f1(x, y)dPY1(dy) PX1–a.s. (113)
Hence µ(x, ·)  PY1 and f1(x, y) = dµ(x,·)dPY1 (y). Let PX be an arbitrary representative of the equivalence class of
PX1 and QY be any measure satisfying PY1  QY . Then
L (X1→Y1) (a)= log
∫
Y
ess-supPX1
(
dµ(X, ·)
dPY1
(y)
)
PY1(dy)
= log
∫
Y
ess-supPX1
(
dµ(X, ·)
dPY1
(y)
)
dPY1
dQY
(y)QY (dy)
= log
∫
Y
ess-supPX1
(
dµ(X, ·)
dQY
(y)
)
QY (dy)
(b)
= log
∫
Y
ess-supPX
(
dµ(X, ·)
dQY
(y)
)
QY (dy),
where (a) follows from Theorem 7, and (b) follows from the fact that for any function h : X → R, ess-supPXh(X) =
ess-supPX1h(X) when PX1 ≡ PX . Now consider PX2 satisfying PX2 ≡ PX1 and let g(x) =
dPX2
dPX1
. For any set
A ∈ σXY ,
PX2Y2(A) =
∫
X
∫
Y
I{(x, y) ∈ A}µ(x, dy)PX2(dx) =
∫
X
∫
Y
g(x)I{(x, y) ∈ A}µ(x, dy)PX1(dx),
hence PX2Y2  PX1Y1 . Similarly, for any set B ∈ σY ,
PY2(B) =
∫
X
∫
Y
I{y ∈ B}µ(x, dy)PX2(dx) =
∫
X
∫
Y
I{y ∈ B}f1(x, y)PY1(dy)PX2(dx),
and
PY1(B) =
∫
X
∫
Y
I{y ∈ B}f1(x, y)PY1(dy)PX1(dx).
Hence PY2(B) = 0 implies that for (PX2 × PY1)-almost all (x, y), I{y ∈ B}f1(x, y) = 0. Since PX1  PX2 , this
implies that for (PX1×PY1)-almost all (x, y), I{y ∈ B}f1(x, y) = 0 [74, p. 22, Ex. 19]. Hence PY1(B) = 0, which
implies that PY1  PY2 . Therefore, we get
PX2Y2  PX1Y1  PX1 × PY1
(a) PX2 × PY2 ,
where (a) follows from the fact that PX1  PX2 and PY1  PY2 . By symmetry we also get PY2  PY1 , hence
PY1 ≡ PY2 . By choosing PX1 to be the representative of the equivalence classes of PX2 and noting that PY2  PY1 ,
the first part of the lemma yields
L (X2→Y2) = log
∫
Y
ess-supPX1
(
dµ(X, ·)
dPY1
)
PY1(dy) = L (X1→Y1) .
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APPENDIX C
PROOF OF EQUATION (38)
Let PY |X =
[
1−W10 W10
W01 1−W01
]
(where the first column corresponds to y = 0, the second to y = 1). Dropping
the logarithm, we can rewrite the problem as:
minimize max{1−W10,W01}+ max{W10, 1−W01} (114)
subject to (1− p)W10 + pW01 ≤ D, 0 ≤W10,W01 ≤ 1.
Now note that
W10 +W01
(a)
≤ 1− p
p
W10 +W01 =
1
p
((1− p)W10 + pW01)
(b)
≤ D
p
(c)
≤ 1, (115)
where (a) follows because p ≤ 1/2, (b) follows from the constraint in (114), and (c) follows because D ≤ p.
Using (115), we can rewrite (114) as
minimize 2− (W10 +W01) (116)
subject to (1− p)W10 + pW01 ≤ D, 0 ≤W10,W01 ≤ 1.
Therefore, we need to maximize (W10 +W01). By (115), the sum is upper-bounded by D/p. The upper bound can
be achieved by setting
W ?10 = 0 and W
?
01 = D/p, (117)
which clearly satisfies the constraint in (114). Therefore,
min
PY |X :
E[d(X,Y )]≤D
L (X→Y ) = log2(2−D/p) (bits). (118)
APPENDIX D
PROOFS FOR SECTIONS VI-E
A. Proof of Theorem 15
To show that the left-hand side is upper-bounded by the right-hand side, fix U , Uˆ and d, and consider:
inf
uˆ(·)
E[d(U, uˆ(Y ))] =
∑
y∈Y
inf
uˆ
PY (y)E[d(U, uˆ)|Y = y]
=
∑
y∈Y
inf
uˆ
∑
x∈supp(X)
PX(x, y)E[d(U, uˆ)|X = x, Y = y]
=
∑
y∈Y
inf
uˆ
∑
x∈supp(X)
PX(x)PY |X(y|x)E[d(U, uˆ)|X = x]
≥
∑
y∈Y
min
x˜∈supp(X)
PY |X(y|x˜) inf
uˆ
∑
x∈supp(X)
PX(x)E[d(U, uˆ)|X = x]
=
∑
y∈Y
min
x˜∈supp(X)
PY |X(y|x˜)
(
inf
uˆ
E[d(U, uˆ)]
)
,
where the third equality follows from the Markov chain U − X − Y . For the reverse direction, let U = X ,
Xˆ = supp(X), and
d(x, xˆ) =
{
1
PX(x)
, x = xˆ,
0, x 6= xˆ.
(119)
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Then
min
xˆ∈supp(X)
E[d(X, xˆ)] = min
xˆ∈supp(X)
∑
x∈supp(X)
PX(x)d(x, xˆ) = min
xˆ∈supp(X)
PX(xˆ)d(xˆ, xˆ) = 1, (120)
and for a given y ∈ Y ,
min
xˆ∈supp(X)
∑
x∈supp(X)
PX(x)PY |X(y|x)d(x, xˆ) = min
xˆ∈supp(X)
PY |X(y|xˆ), (121)
which concludes the proof.
B. Proof of equation (95)
Fix any distribution QY on Y . Then
exp{D∞(PX ×QY ||PXY )} = maxx,y:
PX(x)QY (y)>0
QY (y)
PY |X(y|x)
= max
y:QY (y)>0
QY (y)
min
x:PX(x)>0
PY |X(y|x)
.
If for every y ∈ Y there exists x ∈ supp(PX) such that PY |X(y|x) = 0, then for any QY the above quantity is ∞.
By Theorem 15, Lc (X→Y ) is also ∞ in this case. Now assume ∑y∈Y minx:PX(x)>0 PY |X(y|x) > 0. We have
exp{D∞(PX ×QY ||PXY )} = max
y:QY (y)>0
QY (y)
min
x:PX(x)>0
PY |X(y|x)
≥
∑
y∈Y QY (y)∑
y∈Y
min
x:PX(x)>0
PY |X(y|x)
.
Noting that
∑
y QY (y) = 1, we get infQY D∞(PX × QY ||PXY )} ≥ Lc (X→Y ). One can readily verify that the
lower bound is achievable by setting
QY (y) =
minx:PX(x)>0 PY |X(y|x)∑
y′∈Y minx:PX(x)>0 PY |X(y′|x)
.
Remark 16: In the case of I∞(X;Y ) (cf. (2)), one can readily verify that
QY (y) =
maxx:PX(x)>0 PY |X(y|x)∑
y′∈Y maxx:PX(x)>0 PY |X(y′|x)
(122)
achieves the infimum in (5).
C. Proof of Corollary 5
In the following, assume X has full support.
1) The data processing inequality follows directly from the definition.
2) The “if” direction is straightforward. The “only if” direction follows from the fact that, for each y,
minx PY |X(y|x) ≤ PY (y). Thus,
∑
y minx PY |X(y|x) = 1 ⇒ ∀y,minx PY |X(y|x) = PY (y) ⇒ X and
Y are independent.
3-5) The additivity property and the equality in 4) can be readily verified. Example 14 illustrates 5).
6) Local-differential privacy upper-bounds maximal cost leakage since:
1∑
y minx PY |X(y|x)
=
∑
y PY (y)∑
y minx PY |X(y|x)
≤ max
y
PY (y)
minx PY |X(y|x)
≤ max
x,x′,y
PY |X(y|x′)
PY |X(y|x)
.
7) Convexity follows from the fact that minx PY |X(y|x) is concave in PY |X , and (− log) is a non-increasing
convex function.
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D. Proof of Theorem 16
Without loss of generality, assume X and Y have full marginal support. To show Lrc(X→Y ) ≤ D∞(PX ×
PY ||PXY ), fix any Xˆ , d and y ∈ Y , and consider:
inf
uˆ∈Uˆ
E[d(U, uˆ)|Y = y] = inf
uˆ∈Uˆ
∑
u∈U
PU |Y (u|y)d(u, uˆ)
= inf
uˆ∈Uˆ
∑
u∈U
∑
x∈X
PX|Y (x|y)PU |X(u|x)d(u, uˆ)
= inf
uˆ∈Uˆ
∑
u∈U
∑
x∈X
PY |X(y|x)
PY (y)
PX(x)PU |X(u|x)d(u, uˆ)
≥ inf
uˆ∈Uˆ
minx′ PY |X(y|x′)
PY (y)
∑
u∈U
∑
x∈X
PX(x)PU |X(u|x)d(u, uˆ)
=
minx′ PY |X(y|x′)
PY (y)
inf
uˆ∈Uˆ
E[d(U, uˆ)].
The reverse direction follows by using the same d as in (119).
E. Proof of Corollary 7
To show supPX Lrc(X→Y ) ≤ Ldp(X→Y ), note that PY (y) ≤ maxx PY |X(y|x). For the reverse direction,
consider the following. Let y? be an element achieving the max of Ldp. Let x0 ∈ argminx PY |X(y?|x) and
x1 ∈ argmaxx PY |X(y?|x). Finally, for a given α > 0, let PX(x0) = 1− α and PX(x1) = α. Then,
sup
PX
Lrc(X→Y ) ≥ log PY (y
?)
PY |X(y?|x0)
= log
(1− α)PY |X(y?|x0) + αPY |X(y?|x1)
PY |X(y?|x0)
α→1−−−→ log PY |X(y
?|x1)
PY |X(y?|x0)
= Ldp(X → Y ). 
REFERENCES
[1] D. X. Song, D. Wagner, and X. Tian, “Timing analysis of keystrokes and timing attacks on SSH,” in Proceedings of the 10th USENIX
Security Symposium - Volume 10. Berkeley, CA, USA: USENIX Association, 2001.
[2] A. Ghassami, X. Gong, and N. Kiyavash, “Capacity limit of queueing timing channel in shared FCFS schedulers,” in 2015 IEEE
International Symposium on Information Theory (ISIT), June 2015, pp. 789–793.
[3] C. E. Shannon, “Communication theory of secrecy systems,” Bell System Technical Journal, vol. 28, no. 4, pp. 656–715, 1949.
[4] A. D. Wyner, “The wire-tap channel,” Bell System Technical Journal, vol. 54, no. 8, pp. 1355–1387, Oct. 1975.
[5] S. Leung-Yan-Cheong and M. Hellman, “The Gaussian wire-tap channel,” IEEE Trans. Inf. Theory, vol. 24, no. 4, pp. 451–456, Jul.
1978.
[6] G. Fanti, P. Kairouz, S. Oh, K. Ramchandran, and P. Viswanath, “Hiding the rumor source,” IEEE Trans. Inf. Theory, vol. 63, no. 10,
pp. 6679–6713, Oct 2017.
[7] D. Shah and T. Zaman, “Rumors in a network: Who’s the culprit?” IEEE Trans. Inf. Theory, vol. 57, no. 8, pp. 5163–5181, Aug 2011.
[8] S. B. Wicker, “The loss of location privacy in the cellular age,” Commun. ACM, vol. 55, no. 8, pp. 60–68, aug 2012.
[9] K. Karlsson and S. B. Wicker, “The effect of location granularity on semantic location inferences,” in 2016 49th Hawaii International
Conference on System Sciences (HICSS), Jan 2016, pp. 2197–2204.
[10] K. Zhang and X. Wang, “Peeping tom in the neighborhood: Keystroke eavesdropping on multi-user systems,” in Proceedings
of the 18th USENIX Security Symposium (USENIX Security 09). Montreal, Canada: USENIX, 2009. [Online]. Available:
https://www.usenix.org/node/
[11] Y. Wang and G. E. Suh, “Efficient timing channel protection for on-chip networks,” in Networks on Chip (NoCS), 2012 Sixth IEEE/ACM
International Symposium on, May 2012, pp. 142–151.
[12] S. Kadloor, N. Kiyavash, and P. Venkitasubramaniam, “Mitigating timing side channel in shared schedulers,” Networking, IEEE/ACM
Transactions on, vol. PP, no. 99, pp. 1–12, 2015.
51
[13] P. C. Kocher, “Timing attacks on implementations of Diffie-Hellman, RSA, DSS, and other systems,” in Annual International Cryptology
Conference. Springer, 1996, pp. 104–113.
[14] P. Kocher, J. Jaffe, and B. Jun, “Differential power analysis,” in Annual International Cryptology Conference. Springer, 1999, pp.
388–397.
[15] W. E. Cobb, “Exploitation of unintentional information leakage from integrated circuits,” DTIC Document, Tech. Rep., 2011.
[16] E. A. Koziel, “Effects of architecture on information leakage of a hardware advanced encryption standard implementation,” DTIC
Document, Tech. Rep., 2012.
[17] T. Ristenpart, E. Tromer, H. Shacham, and S. Savage, “Hey, you, get off of my cloud: Exploring information leakage in third-party
compute clouds,” in Proceedings of the 16th ACM Conference on Computer and Communications Security, ser. CCS ’09. New York,
NY, USA: ACM, 2009, pp. 199–212. [Online]. Available: http://doi.acm.org/10.1145/1653662.1653687
[18] P. K. Gopala, L. Lai, and H. El Gamal, “On the secrecy capacity of fading channels,” IEEE Trans. Inf. Theory, vol. 54, no. 10, pp.
4687–4698, Oct. 2008.
[19] I. Csiszár and J. Körner, “Broadcast channels with confidential messages,” IEEE Trans. Inf. Theory, vol. 24, no. 3, pp. 339–348, May
1978.
[20] D. Gunduz, E. Erkip, and H. V. Poor, “Lossless compression with security constraints,” in Proc. IEEE Int. Symp. Inf. Theory (ISIT),
July 2008, pp. 111–115.
[21] L. Sankar, S. Rajagopalan, and H. Poor, “Utility-privacy tradeoffs in databases: An information-theoretic approach,” IEEE. Trans. Inf.
Forensics Security, vol. 8, no. 6, pp. 838–852, June 2013.
[22] G. Smith, “On the foundations of quantitative information flow,” in Foundations of Software Science and Computational Structures,
ser. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, L. de Alfaro, Ed. Springer Berlin Heidelberg, 2009, vol. 5504, pp. 288–302.
[23] C. Schieler and P. Cuff, “Rate-distortion theory for secrecy systems,” IEEE Trans. Inf. Theory, vol. 60, no. 12, pp. 7584–7605, Dec
2014.
[24] H. Yamamoto, “Rate-distortion theory for the Shannon cipher system,” IEEE Trans. Inf. Theory, vol. 43, no. 3, pp. 827–835, 1997.
[25] I. Issa and A. B. Wagner, “Measuring secrecy by the probability of a successful guess,” IEEE Trans. Inf. Theory, vol. 63, no. 6, pp.
3783–3803, June 2017.
[26] I. Csiszar and J. Körner, Information theory: coding theorems for discrete memoryless systems. Cambridge University Press, 2011.
[27] R. Sibson, “Information radius,” Zeitschrift für Wahrscheinlichkeitstheorie und Verwandte Gebiete, vol. 14, no. 2, pp. 149–160, 1969.
[Online]. Available: http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/BF00537520
[28] S. Verdú, “α-mutual information,” in Information Theory and Applications Workshop (ITA), 2015, Feb 2015, pp. 1–6.
[29] C. Schieler and P. Cuff, “The henchman problem: Measuring secrecy by the minimum distortion in a list,” IEEE Trans. Inf. Theory,
vol. 62, no. 6, pp. 3436–3450, June 2016.
[30] N. Weinberger and N. Merhav, “A large deviations approach to secure lossy compression,” IEEE Transactions on Information Theory,
vol. 63, no. 4, pp. 2533–2559, April 2017.
[31] J. C. Duchi, M. I. Jordan, and M. J. Wainwright, “Local privacy and statistical minimax rates,” in Foundations of Computer Science
(FOCS), 2013 IEEE 54th Annual Symposium on, Oct 2013, pp. 429–438.
[32] C. T. Li and A. E. Gamal, “Maximal correlation secrecy,” IEEE Trans. Inf. Theory, vol. 64, no. 5, pp. 3916–3926, 2018.
[33] F. Calmon, M. Varia, M. Médard, M. Christiansen, K. Duffy, and S. Tessaro, “Bounds on inference,” in 51st Annual Allerton Conference
on Communication, Control, and Computing (Allerton), Oct 2013, pp. 567–574.
[34] F. d. P. Calmon, A. Makhdoumi, M. Médard, M. Varia, M. Christiansen, and K. R. Duffy, “Principal inertia components and applications,”
IEEE Transactions on Information Theory, vol. 63, no. 8, pp. 5011–5038, Aug 2017.
[35] C. Braun, K. Chatzikokolakis, and C. Palamidessi, “Quantitative notions of leakage for one-try attacks,” Electronic Notes in Theoretical
Computer Science, vol. 249, pp. 75–91, 2009.
[36] M. Alvim, K. Chatzikokolakis, C. Palamidessi, and G. Smith, “Measuring information leakage using generalized gain functions,” in
Computer Security Foundations Symposium (CSF), 2012 IEEE 25th, June 2012, pp. 265–279.
[37] B. Espinoza and G. Smith, “Min-entropy as a resource,” Information and Computation, vol. 226, pp. 57 – 75, 2013, special Issue:
Information Security as a Resource.
[38] M. S. Alvim, K. Chatzikokolakis, A. McIver, C. Morgan, C. Palamidessi, and G. Smith, “Additive and multiplicative notions of leakage,
and their capacities,” in IEEE 27th Computer Security Foundations Symposium. IEEE, 2014, pp. 308–322.
[39] G. Smith, “Recent developments in quantitative information flow (invited tutorial),” in 2015 30th Annual ACM/IEEE Symposium on
Logic in Computer Science, July 2015, pp. 23–31.
[40] S. Goldwasser and S. Micali, “Probabilistic encryption,” Journal of Computer and System Sciences, vol. 28, no. 2, pp. 270 – 299, 1984.
[41] A. Russell and H. Wang, “How to fool an unbounded adversary with a short key,” IEEE Trans. Inf. Theory, vol. 52, no. 3, pp. 1130–1140,
March 2006.
[42] Y. Dodis and A. Smith, “Entropic security and the encryption of high entropy messages,” in Theory of Cryptography, ser. Lecture
Notes in Computer Science, J. Kilian, Ed. Springer Berlin Heidelberg, 2005, vol. 3378, pp. 556–577.
[43] M. Bellare, S. Tessaro, and A. Vardy, “Semantic security for the wiretap channel,” in Advances in Cryptology–CRYPTO 2012. Springer,
2012, pp. 294–311.
[44] I. Wagner and D. Eckhoff, “Technical privacy metrics: a systematic survey,” arXiv preprint arXiv:1512.00327, 2015.
[45] S.-W. Ho and S. Verdú, “Convexity/concavity of renyi entropy and α-mutual information,” in Proc. IEEE Intl. Symp. Inf. Theory, 2015,
pp. 745–749.
52
[46] A. Rényi, “On measures of dependence,” Acta mathematica hungarica, vol. 10, no. 3-4, pp. 441–451, 1959.
[47] Y. Altug˘ and A. B. Wagner, “Refinement of the random coding bound,” IEEE Trans. Inf. Theory, vol. 60, no. 10, pp. 6005–6023, Oct
2014.
[48] J. Krumm, “Inference attacks on location tracks,” Pervasive computing, pp. 127–143, 2007.
[49] P. Venkitasubramaniam, T. He, and L. Tong, “Anonymous networking amidst eavesdroppers,” IEEE Trans. Inf. Theory, vol. 54, no. 6,
pp. 2770–2784, June 2008.
[50] C. Dwork, F. McSherry, K. Nissim, and A. Smith, “Calibrating noise to sensitivity in private data analysis,” in Proceedings of the Third
Conference on Theory of Cryptography, ser. TCC’06. Berlin, Heidelberg: Springer-Verlag, 2006, pp. 265–284.
[51] P. Kairouz, S. Oh, and P. Viswanath, “The composition theorem for differential privacy,” in Proceedings of the 32nd International
Conference on Machine Learning, ICML 2015, Lille, France, 6-11 July 2015, 2015, pp. 1376–1385.
[52] A. B. Wagner and V. Anantharam, “Zero-rate reliability of the exponential-server timing channel,” IEEE Trans. Inf. Theory, vol. 51,
no. 2, pp. 447–465, Feb 2005.
[53] P. Brémaud, “Point processes and queues: martingale dynamics,” 1981.
[54] P. Billingsley, “Probability and measure, ser,” Probability and Mathematical Statistics. New York: Wiley, 1995.
[55] L. Kleinrock, Queueing Systems, Vol. I: Theory. Wiley, 1975.
[56] E. Parzen, Stochastic processes. SIAM, 1999.
[57] N. Merhav and E. Arıkan, “The Shannon cipher system with a guessing wiretapper,” IEEE Trans. Inf. Theory, vol. 45, no. 6, pp.
1860–1866, 1999.
[58] Y. Wu and P. Yang, “Chebyshev polynomials, moment matching, and optimal estimation of the unseen,” arXiv:1504.01227, 2016.
[59] T. S. Han and S. Verdú, “Generalizing the Fano inequality,” IEEE Trans. Inf. Theory, vol. 40, no. 4, pp. 1247–1251, Jul 1994.
[60] T. van Erven and P. Harremos, “Rényi divergence and Kullback-Leibler divergence,” IEEE Trans. Inf. Theory, vol. 60, no. 7, pp.
3797–3820, July 2014.
[61] J. Liao, O. Kosut, L. Sankar, and F. P. Calmon, “A general framework for information leakage.” [Online]. Available: http://sankar.
engineering.asu.edu/wp-content/uploads/2015/02/A-General-Framework-for-Information-Leakage-Privacy-Utility-Trade-offs1.pdf
[62] C. Dwork, “Differential privacy: A survey of results,” in Theory and applications of models of computation. Springer, 2008, pp. 1–19.
[63] H. O. Hirschfeld, “A connection between correlation and contingency,” Mathematical Proceedings of the Cambridge Philosophical
Society, vol. 31, no. 4, p. 520–524, 1935.
[64] H. Gebelein, “Das statistische problem der korrelation als variations-und eigenwertproblem und sein zusammenhang mit der
ausgleichsrechnung,” ZAMM-Journal of Applied Mathematics and Mechanics/Zeitschrift für Angewandte Mathematik und Mechanik,
vol. 21, no. 6, pp. 364–379, 1941.
[65] S. Asoodeh, M. Diaz, F. Alajaji, and T. Linder, “Estimation efficiency under privacy constraints,” arXiv preprint arXiv:1707.02409,
2017.
[66] R. Ahlswede and P. Gács, “Spreading of sets in product spaces and hypercontraction of the markov operator,” Ann. Prob., vol. 4, no. 6,
pp. 925–939, 1976.
[67] Y. M. Shtar’kov, “Universal sequential coding of single messages,” Problemy Peredachi Informatsii, vol. 23, no. 3, pp. 3–17, 1987.
[68] M. M. Prabhakaran and V. M. Prabhakaran, “Rényi Information Complexity and an Information Theoretic Characterization of
the Partition Bound,” in 43rd International Colloquium on Automata, Languages, and Programming (ICALP 2016), ser. Leibniz
International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs), I. Chatzigiannakis, M. Mitzenmacher, Y. Rabani, and D. Sangiorgi, Eds.,
vol. 55. Dagstuhl, Germany: Schloss Dagstuhl–Leibniz-Zentrum fuer Informatik, 2016, pp. 88:1–88:14. [Online]. Available:
http://drops.dagstuhl.de/opus/volltexte/2016/6197
[69] J. Liao, L. Sankar, F. P. Calmon, and V. Y. F. Tan, “Hypothesis testing under maximal leakage privacy constraints,” in IEEE Int. Symp.
Inf. Theory (ISIT), June 2017, pp. 779–783.
[70] Y. Wang, Y. O. Basciftci, and P. Ishwar, “Privacy-utility tradeoffs under constrained data release mechanisms,” arXiv preprint
arXiv:1710.09295, 2017.
[71] D. Williams, Probability with martingales. Cambridge university press, 1991.
[72] R. G. Bartle, The elements of integration and Lebesgue measure. John Wiley & Sons, 2014.
[73] R. G. Gallager, Information Theory and Reliable Communication. John Wiley and Sons, 1968.
[74] O. Kallenberg, Foundations of Modern Probability. Springer, 2002.
